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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the historical controversy surrounding the official removal of 
J. Robert Oppenheimer's security clearance. It argues that the majority finding of the 
Atomic Energy Commission, which scholarship on the subject has generally rejected, was 
essentially correct in concluding that Oppenheimer's clearance was removed due to defects 
in his character The thesis begins with an analysis of the security hearing itself, revealing 
how the Personnel Security Board was less concerned with Oppenheimer's loyalty and 
discretion than with various facets of his character. Much of the testimony dealt with the 
quality of Oppenheimer's advice, and issues such as his "wisdom," "influence," 
"arrogance," and lack of "enthusiasm". In order to explain the case against Oppenheimer, 
this thesis studies the origins and nature of Oppenheimer's character. This begins with an 
examination of Oppenheimer's childhood and school life, where strong ethical and moral 
values were instilled in him. It goes on to look at Oppenheimer's entry into the international 
world of science, and his development of a strong faith in the canons of science. It 
documents how Oppenheimer, perhaps due to his brilliance, also became something of an 
intellectual snob during this period, and was often verbally abusive to those less intelligent 
than him. The burden of this thesis maintains that Oppenheimer represented a way of 
thinking and of being that was antipathetic to those who dominated the policy-making 
circles he entered after the war. Oppenheimer's unpopular ideas regarding defense policy, 
weapons development, and candor in nuclear matters, combined with his arrogance and 
influence, earned him powerful enemies. Such enemies were responsible for the initiation 
of his security hearing and the resuhing removal of his clearance. This thesis concludes that 
Oppenheimer's character, which was well suited to the world of science, was completely 
unsuited to the Cold War policy-making circles he entered after World War II, and that the 
removal of his security clearance arose out of this discord. 
INTRODUCTION 
On 29 June 1954, the United States Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) officially 
withdrew J. Robert Oppenheimer's security clearance. Not only was J. Robert 
Oppenheimer a renowned physicist, but he was the celebrated "father of the A-bomb", the 
holder of the government's highest civilian award for national service, and the former 
chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission's General Advisory Committee. As a frequent 
consultant to various government agencies, Oppenheimer had been privy to the nation's 
most sensitive secrets. Oppenheimer's security hearing was ostensibly primarily concerned 
with the security risk inherent in his former Communist and left-wing associations. As a 
result of the hearing it was determined that Oppenheimer was a loyal and unusually discreet 
citizen. However, after Oppenheimer was unanimously cleared of being a security risk, in 
the ordinary meaning of the term, his clearance was formally revoked by a majority 
decision of both a specially convened Personnel Security Board, and the five-man Atomic 
Energy Commission. The majority opinion of the AEC, authored by critic Lewis Strauss, 
said that Oppenheimer's security clearance was permanently removed because of 
"fundamental defects in his 'character'" ^ 
The transcript of the Oppenheimer hearing was immediately published and sparked 
considerable debate. Almost half a century later the debate surrounding the Oppenheimer 
hearing continues to attract scholarly attention. This hearing was a watershed moment for 
security policy. The transcript of the hearing was the first such document released after the 
1947 AEC loyalty-security program and Eisenhower's 1953 federal employees security 
program. It gave the public its first chance to study security policy, and it provoked outrage. 
Even a cursory reading of the transcript revealed that the Oppenheimer case never really 
concerned issues of loyalty or discretion. It quickly became apparent that, among other 
things, it was the acceptability of Oppenheimer's advice that had been on trial. Many 
liberals were outraged because they believed Oppenheimer was put on trial for holding 
opinions, or for "thought-crimes," a concern raised by Vannevar Bush during the hearing 
itself^ Ever since news of the Oppenheimer hearing broke, and particularly after the 
' United States Atomic Energy Commission. In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer: Texts of Principal 
Documents and Letters of Personnel Security Board, General Manager, Commissioners {^2&\an!gior\: United 
States Government Printing Office, 1954), p. 51. 
- United States Atomic Energy Commission, In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer: Transcript of Hearing 
before Personnel Security Board (Washington: United States Printing Office, 1954). p. 565. 
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transcript was published, historical debate has raged as to the real causes behind the 
hearing. 
Much of the literature that has been published on Oppenheimer and his removal 
does not deal specifically with the causes behind his security hearing. Writers such as Peter 
Goodchild, James Kunetka, Peter Michelmore and Denise Royal have all written detailed 
biographies.^ Scholars such as Joseph Haberer have studied the Oppenheimer hearing as far 
as it sheds light on differences within the community of science and the relationship 
between science and government."* The Oppenheimer hearing is also embedded in the wider 
literature concerning the end of World War II and the onset of the Cold War. Some scholars 
have sought refuge in easy generalizations and dangerous oversimplifications, portraying 
the Oppenheimer hearing as a product of McCarthy ism. ^  Though the political climate of the 
times undoubtedly made Oppenheimer's removal all the more easy and may have dictated 
something of the shape that it took, the Oppenheimer hearing cannot simply be written off 
as a manifestation of McCarthyism. McCarthy played no direct role in Oppenheimer's 
removal and it seems clear that those who did play such roles would have effected 
Oppenheimer's removal even without the aid of anti-Communist sentiment. 
Though there is a great deal of literature that does not address the central question 
of why Oppenheimer was removed, there is also much that does. While studying the forces 
behind the hearing, scholars such as Arthur Schlesinger and Diana Trilling recognized early 
the importance of Oppenheimer's opposition to the H-bomb, the personal animosities of 
individuals such as Edward Teller and Lewis Strauss, and the hostility of the Strategic Air 
Command.^  However, their analyses fall short in critical areas. Trilling brilliantly revealed 
the true cause of the hearing when she said that Oppenheimer was reinvestigated "because 
he represented a way of thinking and perhaps even of being which was antipathetic to a 
^ Goodchild, J. Robert Oppenheimer: 'Shatterer of Worlds' (London: British Broadcasting Corporation, 
1980). James W. Kunetka Oppenheimer: The Years of Risk (En^ewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1982). 
Peter Michehnore, The Swift Years: The Robert Oppenheimer Story (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 
1969) Denise Royal, The Story of J Robert Oppenheimer (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969). 
^ Joseph Haberer. Politics and the Community of Science (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 
1969). 
' The Oppenheimer hearing is featured in many books on anti-Communism, for example see David Caute, 
The Great Fear: The Anti-Communist Purge Under Truman and Eisenhower (New York: Simon and 
Schuster. 1978). 
* Arthur M. Schlesinger, 'The Oppenheimer Case", The Atlantic, 194 (October 1954), pp. 29-36. 
Diana Trilling. 'The Oppenheimer Case: A Reading of the Testimony", Partisan Review, 21 (1954), pp. 604-
635. 
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dominant faction" then in power in policy-making circles.^ However, she does not explain 
how or why he represented such a way of thinking or being, and her article, as Hans 
Q 
Meyerhoff has pointed out, is in parts "far fetched and wildly speculative." 
Two of the best books on the subject are Thomas Wilson's The Great Weapons 
Heresy and Philip M. Stem's The Oppenheimer Case: Security on Trial.^ Wilson stresses 
Oppenheimer's policy views as a cause, while Stem argues that it was not only policy 
views, but Oppenheimer's arrogant personality, which led to his removal. While Stem in 
particular offers brilliant insight into the factors behind the hearing, neither he nor Wilson 
take their analyses far enough, treating Oppenheimer's policy views and his numerous 
personal enemies as two separate causes, rather than as two manifestations of a single 
underlying cause. Wilson, like many other scholars, also goes too far in his attempt to 
differentiate between the "real" as opposed to the "ostensible" factors behind the 
Oppenheimer case. He argues that the real factors behind the hearing had nothing to do 
with the ostensible issues of "loyahy," "associations," and "character."'^ Even a cursory 
study of the testimony reveals the fact that Oppenheimer's loyalty and discretion were never 
seriously in question. It is equally clear that since Oppenheimer was seen as both loyal and 
discreet, the issue of "associations" became essentially meaningless. Having disposed of 
the issues of "loyahy" and "associations," most scholars, like Wilson, go on to dismiss the 
issue of "character" in a similar fashion. Scholars often cite Oppenheimer's long list of 
distinguished character witnesses to show that his character was above reproach. Many 
argue that the character issue was simply used to disguise the real issues. Philip Reiff, for 
example, argues that "the open decision on his character masked the hidden decision on his 
policy."'' Such an approach reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the issues. 
Oppenheimer's character and policy views were not separate issues, but rather 
Oppenheimer's character was the underlying source of his policy views. 
It is clear that Strauss' judgement of Oppenheimer's character, which was primarily 
based on the issue of veracity, does not ring tme. However, to argue that Oppenheimer was 
Trilling. 'The Oppenheimer Case: A Reading of the Testimony", p. 615. 
* Hans Meyerhoff and Diana Trilling. 'The Oppenheimer Case: An Exchange", Partisan Review, 22 (1955), 
pp. 238-251. 
' Thomas W. Wilson. The Great Weapons Heresy (Boston: Houghton Mifilia, 1970), p. 50. 
Philip M. Stem, The Oppenheimer Case: Security on Trial (New York: Harper and Row, 1969). 
'° Wilson, The Great Weapons Heresy, p. xxi. 
" PhiUp Reiff "The Case of Dr. Oppenlieimer". The Twentieth Centurv, 156 (August-September 1954), pp. 
114. 
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removed due to his character is not to accept Strauss' portrayal of Oppenheimer's character. 
As Diana Trilling said, Oppenheimer was removed "because he represented a way of 
thinking and perhaps even of being which was antipathetic to a dominant faction" then in 
power in policy-making circles.'^ It was Oppenheimer's character, or his "way of being," 
that lost him his security clearance. In an effort to explain the forces behind the 
Oppenheimer hearing, scholars have rightly pointed to Oppenheimer's opposition to the H-
bomb, his alienation of the Strategic Air Command, and his numerous powerful personal 
enemies. However, because they treat these things as separate and singular factors, and do 
not show their origins or intercormected nature, their analyses fall short of offering a tme 
understanding of the issues. It is only through an understanding of Oppenheimer's character 
that these separate issues can be seen as part of a larger whole, and thus begin to make 
sense. 
The purpose of the following chapters is to take the scholarship on the Oppenheimer 
hearing one step further, bringing it full circle and retuming to the majority finding of the 
AEC. Chapter 1 undertakes an analysis of the transcript and the principal documents, 
showing how these documents reveal Oppenheimer's character to be the central issue on 
trial in early 1954. Chapter 2 looks at the origins and nature of Oppenheimer's character. 
This chapter looks at the strong morals that were instilled in Oppenheimer at an early age, 
the character traits he acquired while maturing within the intemational world of science, 
and his development of not only an ability to charm and persuade, but also a talent for 
antagonizing and alienating. Chapter 3 studies how Oppenheimer's role as director of the 
A-bomb project at Los Alamos was largely motivated, on his behalf, by moral 
considerations. It goes on to look at how such motivating factors, particularly the belief that 
the United States was in a desperate race against Nazism, had evaporated by the end of the 
project. The evaporation of such motivating factors, combined with the terrible destmction 
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, left Oppenheimer with feelings of guih and a desire to ensure 
that nuclear power would come to represent a great hope rather than a great peril. This 
chapter also looks at examples of Oppenheimer's arrogance and sharp tongue. Chapter 4, 
the final chapter, examines how Oppenheimer's character was completely unsuited to the 
policy-making circles he entered after the war. Oppenheimer's moral outlook resulted in his 
opposition to the H-bomb, his emphasis on tactical over strategic weapons, and his 
'" Trilling, 'The Oppenheimer Case: A Reading of the Testimony", p. 615. 
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criticism of Air Force doctrine, the same doctrine which would later become the basis of 
official defense strategy. Oppenheimer's great belief in free and open debate, fundamental 
to his outlook as a scientist, also led him to call for greater candor on the government's 
behalf and a reduction in the levels of secrecy surrounding nuclear issues. Oppenheimer's 
views engendered animosities among H-bomb advocates such as Lewis Strauss and Edward 
Teller, and among officials of the Strategic Air Command. Not only would Oppenheimer's 
views create powerful enemies, but as the Cold War set in, his views would be seen in 
increasingly sinister terms, alienating even more moderate officials. Oppenheimer's 
arrogance was also to play an important role in this period. His unfriendly relationship with 
Lewis Strauss is studied in particular, for it is Strauss who would later conclude that 
Oppenheimer should have his security clearance removed due to fundamental defects of 
character. 
CHAPTER 1 
IN THE MATTER OF J. ROBERT 
OPPENHEIMER. 
8 
From 12 April through 6 May 1954, a specially convened Personnel Security Board 
of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) held a hearing to determine whether J. Robert 
Oppenheimer was a security risk, and as such should have his security clearance removed. 
For three weeks mnning Oppenheimer sat on a nondescript leather couch while his life was 
laid bare in often-embarrassing detail, and his actions and motivations were dissected and 
discussed. Five times Oppenheimer himself took the witness chair; his own testimony 
filling about a quarter of the 993 page published transcript.^ The whole affair was supposed 
to be confidential, but the New York Times ran the story on the second day of the hearing. 
The charges against Oppenheimer had been presented in a 3000-word letter from 
AEC General Manager, Kenneth R. Nichols.^ This letter presented some twenty-four 
allegations, the first twenty-three of which concemed Oppenheimer's Communist and left-
wing connections from 1938 to 1946. The twenty-fourth and final charge concemed 
Oppenheimer's opposition to the H-bomb. Thus, ostensibly, the hearing was primarily 
concemed with Oppenheimer's former Communist "associations". However, things were 
not as simple as they appeared. The first twenty-three charges concemed events that had 
taken place, and were known to have taken place, prior to the AEC's meticulous review of 
the Oppenheimer file in 1947, and its subsequent unanimous clearance of him. Lewis 
Strauss reaffirmed Oppenheimer's loyalty again in 1948."* Such simple facts alone raise 
questions about the real factors behind the hearing. 
In an effort to understand the case against Oppenheimer, the most informative area 
of the transcript to study is the testimony of the principal witnesses for the "prosecution" 
This testimony, more than anything else in the documentation, is sure to expose the real 
issues involved in the Oppenheimer hearing. It is this testimony that reveals what the AEC 
considered to be the primary reasons for denying Oppenheimer's security clearance. The 
principal witnesses called by the AEC were Dr. Teller and Dr. Alvarez, both physicists; Dr. 
Pitzer and Dr. Latimer, two chemists; Mr. Griggs, the former chief scientist to the 
' United States Atomic Energy Commission, In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer: Transcript of Hearing 
before Personnel Security Board (Washington: United States Printing Office, 1954). Hereafter noted as 
Transcript. 
^ "'Dr. Oppenheimer Suspended by A.E.C. in Securitj' Review; Scientist Defends Record" New York Times, 
13 April 1954, p. 1. 
^ Transcript, p. 3-7. 
" Barton J. Bernstein, "The Oppenheimer Loyalty-Security Case Reconsidered", Stanford Law Review, 42, 
1383 (July 1990), p. 1401. 
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Department of the Air Force; and General Wilson, a Major General in the Strategic Air 
Command (SAC).^  Not one of these witnesses was qualified to testify about the first 
twenty-two of the twenty-four charges against Oppenheimer. Thus the supposedly central 
issue behind the hearing - Oppenheimer's pro-Communist or left-wing associations - did 
not arise in the course of their testimony. 
If the fact that the principal witnesses called by the AEC were not qualified to 
comment on the first twenty-two charges leads one to conclude that the case was not really 
about Oppenheimer's "associations", the testimony of these individuals eliminates all doubt 
on the subject. None of these witnesses raised doubts about Oppenheimer's loyalty or his 
discretion with classified information. In fact, they all openly affirmed Oppenheimer's 
loyahy. General Wilson, when discussing why Oppenheimer should be removed, said: "I 
would like to first say that I am not talking about loyalty. I want this clearly understood."*^ 
The other AEC witnesses also made it clear that their concems about Oppenheimer were 
not due to issues of loyahy. Thus we have the principal witnesses for the "prosecution" 
affirming that the accused is a loyal citizen, removing the primary reason he would be 
considered a security risk. The question now arises as to just how Oppenheimer was 
considered a security risk. 
Before going on to discuss why Oppenheimer was considered a security risk, 
another revealing fact about this group of witnesses must be mentioned. All the principal 
AEC witnesses voluntarily admitted that they were incapable of objectivity towards 
Oppenheimer. They had all consistently opposed Oppenheimer in behind-the-scenes 
stmggles over military policy and weapons development. All these men were advocates of 
a certain approach to national defense and strategy which eventually led to the doctrine of 
"Massive Retaliation." Wilson stated in his testimony, "I am first of all a big-bomb 
man...[and] a dedicated airman," and said that this had to be understood or his testimony 
would not make sense.^ Griggs said, "the testimony that I have to give here before this 
board...is testimony which will be concemed at least in part with two very controversial 
issues on which I was a participant...on the opposite side of this controversy to Dr. 
Oppenheimer."^ Because of this, Griggs said that he might "not be fiiUy capable of 
^ Wilson, The Great Weapons Heresy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1970), p. 195. 
^ Transcript, p. 684. 
^ Ibid., pp. 684, 689. 
^ Ibid., p. 746. 
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objectivity."' Teller admitted that his views on Oppenheimer were "based on feelings, 
emotions, and prejudices."'° Roger Robb, who represented the AEC and played the role of 
a prosecutor, was not disturbed by such open statements of bias, but in fact drew out and 
discussed the areas where the witnesses had disagreed with Oppenheimer. Thus it is 
obvious that the AEC considered these disagreements to be of some importance. 
Upon study of the testimony of the principal AEC witnesses, it is easy to conclude 
that Oppenheimer was put on trial for holding unpopular opinions. Vannevar Bush, leader 
of the nation's scientific mobilization effort during World War II, who appeared as a pro-
Oppenheimer witness, made just such an observation. He said, 
I feel that this board has made a mistake and that it is a serious one. I feel that the 
letter of General Nichols.. is quite capable of being interpreted as placing a man 
on trial because he held opinions.. and as I move about I find that discussed 
today very energetically, that here is a man who is being pilloried because he had 
strong opinions, and had the temerity to express them.'' 
Bush was closer to the mark than he knew. As will be discussed later, not only did the 
board fail to object to the nature of initial H-bomb charge, they also listened to testimony 
conceming issues such as the Vista report, the "second-lab" issue, the Lincoln Summer 
Study, and nuclear weapons development. Such testimony did not deal with Oppenheimer's 
motivations or loyalty but purely his policy views. It was the acceptability of 
Oppenheimer's advice that was being debated and considered. 
The testimony of General Wilson offers a good illustration of the manner in which 
Oppenheimer was judged. Wilson discussed an alarming "pattem" in Oppenheimer's 
activities. After stating that he was a "dedicated airman," Wilson outlined this pattern, 
saying: 
First was my awareness of the fact that Dr. Oppenheimer was interested in what I 
call the intemationalizing of atomic energy, this at a time when the United States 
had a monopoly, and in which many people, including myself, believed that the A-
bomb in the hands of the Unhed States with an Air Force capable of using it was 
^ Transcript, p. 746. 
^"^ Ibid., p. 121. 
" Ibid., p. 565. 
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probably the greatest deterrent to further Russian aggression. This was a concern. 
(Emphasis added). 
Wilson had already stated at this point that he did not believe that Oppenheimer's advice 
was motivated by disloyahy. It is easy to understand why Wilson and the Air Force were 
concemed with Oppenheimer's views, but it is far from clear how such views were relevant 
to the hearing if they were not a reflection of sinister motives. Wilson went on to discuss 
Oppenheimer's opposition to two Air Force backed nuclear detection devices; his 
opposition to a nuclear-powered aircraft; and the fact that he approached thermonuclear 
weapons with "more conservatism than the Air Force would have liked." These events 
were all part of the "pattem" Wilson discussed. Such issues had nothing to do with 
Oppenheimer being a security risk, and everything to do with Oppenheimer, in the eyes of 
the Air Force, offering unwelcome advice and criticism. 
Wilson offered further insight into the issues behind the Oppenheimer hearing when 
he remarked: 
The fact that he [Oppenheimer] is such a brilliant man, the fact that he has such a 
command of the English language, has such national prestige, and such power of 
persuasion, only made me nervous, because I feh if this was so it would not be to 
the interest of the United States.. ."''* 
Here Wilson seemed to be saying that Oppenheimer's very character conflicted with 
national interests. However, Wilson's testimony makes it clear that he was equating 
national interests with the interests of the Air Force. Wilson, as mentioned earlier, had 
already admitted he was a dedicated airman and big-bomb man. What becomes clear is that 
the Air Force felt threatened by Oppenheimer, not simply because of his policy views, but 
because of his influential character, and feh that he should be removed. Oppenheimer was 
considered a security risk, not for lack of loyalty to the United States, but lack of loyalty to 
the Air Force. 
If Wilson remained a somewhat reserved spokesman for the Air Force, David 
Tressel Griggs, former Chief Scientist of the Air Force, was less inhibited. Griggs picked 
up on some of the ideas of Wilson, particularly the idea of Oppenheimer's actions betraying 
an alarming pattem of activities. Griggs said: 
'" Transcript, p. 684. 
' V6/i/., p. 685. 
'V*;V/.,p.685. 
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there was a pattem of activities, all of which involved Dr. Oppenheimer. One of 
these was the Vista Project... We were told that... Oppenheimer and two other 
colleagues formed an informal committee of three to work for world peace or some 
such purpose, as they saw it. We were also told that in this effort they considered 
that many things were more important than the development of the thermonuclear 
weapon...It was further told [to] me...that in order to achieve world peace...it was 
necessary.. .to give up.. .the Strategic Air Command."'^ 
It must be pointed out that this was a clear distortion of Oppenheimer's views. However, 
Griggs did not stop here, but took this "pattem of activities" idea a step further, suggesting 
some kind of conspiracy. Griggs told of seeing Dr. Zacharias write the initials Z.O.R.C. on 
a blackboard in front of fifty to a hundred people at a meeting of the Scientific Advisory 
Board in 1952.'^ He went on to explain that Z was for Zacharias, O for Oppenheimer, R for 
Rabi, and C for Charles Lauritsen. This group supposedly supported Oppenheimer in his 
advocacy of world peace and abolishment of the Strategic Air Command. Not only did 
Lauritsen deny, under oath, that he ever wrote these letters on a blackboard, but not one of 
the other fifty to a hundred people that were supposed to have witnessed this event was ever 
produced. 
In the course of Griggs' testimony, we once again see that the alarming "pattem of 
activities" that was being discussed simply referred to Oppenheimer voicing ideas, or being 
connected to ideas, that clashed with those held by the Air Force. Many of the issues Griggs 
discussed, and was in fact encouraged to discuss by Roger Robb, had absolutely no 
relevance to the charges outlined in the Nichols letter. Griggs discussed, in some detail, 
Oppenheimer's role in the Vista Project and the Lincoln Summer Study, and why the Air 
Force was unhappy with these projects. At one point Griggs said: "we [the Air Force] have 
learned to be a little cautious about study projects which have in mind making budget 
allocations or recommending budget allocations for major components of the Military 
1 7 
Establishment." Griggs was also unhappy with the fact that the Lincoln Summer Study, 
ftinded primarily by the Air Force, studied submarine defense. This, once again, had 
nothing to do with Oppenheimer being a security risk, and everything to do with the Air 
Force being unhappy with Oppenheimer's advice. 
^^ Transcript, p. 749. 
'^ Ibid., p. 750. 
^' Ibid 
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Griggs readily admitted, on more than one occasion, that his ideas about 
Oppenheimer were largely based on "hearsay evidence" and "impressions."' It is clear that 
Griggs had a certain impression of Oppenheimer's character, and with this impression in 
mind, wrongly attributed various views and incidents to Oppenheimer and his influence. 
The testimony of Dr. Kenneth Pitzer, like that of many other witnesses, seems to have been 
based on the very same thing. With regard to Oppenheimer's opposition to the H-bomb, 
Pitzer said: 
I have no personal knowledge of Dr. Oppenheimer going to Mr. X and saying don't 
work at Los Alamos, or of his making a technical recommendation obviously and 
distinctly contrary to the demonstrable good of the program. On the other hand, I 
have great difficuhy believing that the program would have had certain 
difficulties...if he had enthusiastically urged individuals to participate in the 
program, because as I said before, he was a great personal influence among 
theoretical physicists."'' 
Oppenheimer was apparently a security risk, in Pitzer's view, because he failed to show 
"enthusiasm" for the H-bomb. Such an idea would resurface in the findings of the Gray 
Board majorhy. 
When reading the testimony of the AEC witnesses, it becomes clear that fear of 
Oppenheimer's influence was an important factor behind the hearing. Wendell Latimer, 
under direction from Robb, testified at length about Oppenheimer's influence. Latimer 
attributed to Oppenheimer an almost supematural ability to persuade people, tracing a 
number of events back to his influence. Latimer argued that many people came back from 
Los Alamos pacifists, going on to say that he judged this to be due "very largely to... this 
tremendous influence he [Oppenheimer] had over those young men."^° Latimer also 
attributed a number of other things to Oppenheimer and his influence, such as a desire to 
disband Los Alamos, opposition to the H-bomb, and "the 4 years that we twiddled our 
thumbs," in post-war atomic research.^' Latimer argued, like Wilson and Griggs, that all 
these things gave "a certain pattem" to Oppenheimer's philosophy. He argued that "not 
only General Groves, but the other members of the [General Advisory] committee... were 
'* Transcript, p. 746. 
^"^ Ibid., p. 106. 
-''Ibid 
-' Ibid 
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under the influence of Dr. Oppenheimer."^^ Latimer maintained that the only reason he had 
not fallen under Oppenheimer's spell himself was due to the fact he hadn't been in close 
enough contact with Oppenheimer. 
Like Latimer, Alvarez also discussed Oppenheimer's influence in his testimony. As 
far as people being opposed to the H-bomb, Alvarez said, "every time I have found a 
person who feh this way, I have seen Dr. Oppenheimer's influence on that persons mind." 
However, when asked if this meant that he thought Oppenheimer was disloyal, Alvarez 
responded "Absolutely not, sir."'^ '' None of the principal AEC witnesses questioned 
Oppenheimer's loyahy. Alvarez argues that Oppenheimer's stance on the H-bomb issue did 
not reflect disloyahy, but rather "exceedingly poor judgement."^^ Thus it was argued that 
Oppenheimer was a securhy risk because of his poor judgement, which was given all the 
more weight due to his great influence. Latimer stated this even more clearly, saying that 
all Oppenheimer's "reactions were such to give me considerable worry about his judgement 
as a security risk." (Emphasis added). Once again we see Oppenheimer being condemned 
as a security risk simply due to his judgement on policy issues. 
The testimony of Edward Teller sheds the most light on this issue of Oppenheimer 
being considered a security risk due to the quality of his judgement. At one point Gordon 
Gray directly asked Teller if he felt "that it would endanger the common defense and 
97 
security to grant clearance to Dr. Oppenheimer?" This was the frindamental question that 
formed the basis of the entire hearing, and Teller's response was enlightening. Teller 
answered: 
I believe...that Dr. Oppenheimer's character is such that he would not knowingly 
and willingly do anything that is designed to endanger the safety of this country. To 
the extent, therefore, that your question is directed toward intent, I would say I do 
not see any reason to deny clearance. If it is a question of wisdom and judgement, as 
demonstrated by actions since 1945, then I would say one would be wiser not to 
grant clearance. (Emphasis added). 
"• Transcript, p. 
-^  Ibid., 
-'Ibid., 
-'Ibid 
'-'Ibid., 
-'^ Ibid., 
''Ibid 
802. 
p. 803. 
p. 660. 
p. 726. 
663. 
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This issue of "wisdom and judgement", in the manner which it is discussed in such 
testimony, can only mean agreement with official views. Thus the principal witnesses of 
the AEC suggested that Oppenheimer should be removed because he was an influential 
advisor who did not agree with official views. This was an entirely new, and very 
dangerous, understanding of the term "security risk", though it is not altogether surprising 
given the political environment of the early stages of the Cold War. 
On 29 June 1954, one day before Oppenheimer's consulting contract would have 
ended, his security clearance was formally removed.^^ The decision to remove 
Oppenheimer's clearance was taken by a two-to-one decision of the Personnel Security 
Board (the Gray Board); by a separate finding by the General Manager of the AEC; and by 
a four-to-one vote of the AEC commissioners. A study of the testimony indicates that 
Oppenheimer was being removed because he was an unwelcome source of advice and 
criticism. Though the testimony of the principal AEC witnesses does help to reveal the real 
issues involved in the Oppenheimer hearing, the findings of the Gray Board and the Atomic 
Energy Commission offer even clearer insight into the factors that led to the removal of 
Oppenheimer's clearance. 
The three-man Gray Board consisted of Dr. Gordon Gray, Dr. Ward Evans, and Mr. 
Thomas Morgan. The Gray Board found twenty of the twenty-four allegations to be "tme" 
or "substantially tme."^° It must again be noted that the first twenty-three charges could be 
no "tmer" then they had been in 1947, when the AEC had cleared Oppenheimer after a 
meticulous review of his file. In his dissenting opinion, Evans wrote: 
Most of this derogatory information was in the hands of the Commission when Dr. 
Oppenheimer was cleared in 1947. They apparently were aware of his associations 
and his left-wing policies; yet they cleared him. They took a chance on him because 
of his special talents and he continued to do a good job. Now when the job is done, 
we are asked to investigate him for practically the same derogatory 
information.... To deny him clearance now for what he was cleared for in 1947, 
^^  Rachel L. HoUoway, In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer: Politics, Rhetoric, and Self-Defense 
(London: Praeger, 1993). p. 3. 
^ United States Atomic Energy Commission, In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer: Texts of Principal 
Documents and Letters of Personnel Security Board, General Manager, Commissioners (Washington: United 
States Government Printing Office, 1954), pp. 3-13. Hereafter cited as Principal Documents. 
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when we must know he is less of a security risk now than he was then, seems to be 
hardly the procedure to be adopted in a free country. 
This comment stmck to the heart of many of the injustices of the Oppenheimer hearing, as 
well as to the factors behind it. It is clear, as Evans points out, that Oppenheimer was less 
of a security risk in 1954 than he was in 1947. However this is only if one operates from a 
traditional understanding of the term "security risk" As discussed earlier, the idea of 
"security risk" was redefined in the course of the Oppenheimer hearing to include sources 
of unwelcome advice and criticism. 
The Majority Report itself dismissed the significance of the first twenty-three 
charges, concluding that though "Dr. Oppenheimer was deeply involved with many people 
who were active Communists,...there is no indication of disloyalty." The Board also 
concluded that "Dr. Oppenheimer seems to have had a high degree of discretion reflecting 
as unusual ability to keep to himself vital secrets"^^ Thus the Board concluded that 
Oppenheimer was a loyal and discreet citizen who possessed an unusual ability to keep 
secrets to himself This should have, in effect, done away with the hearing. As Evans said 
in his dissenting opinion, "We don't have to go out of our way and invent something;.. .it is 
not our function to rewrite any clearance mles;... we don't have to dig deeply to find other 
ways he may be a security risk"^"* But the other two members of the board did just this. 
The Majority Report of the Board clearly stated that "Dr. Oppenheimer served his 
Government because it sought him," going on to say: "the Nation owes these scientists, we 
believe, a great debt of gratitude for loyal and magnificent service. This is particularly tme 
with respect to Dr. Oppenheimer"?^ The report then went on to say that the advice of 
people such as Oppenheimer must be "uncolored and uninfluenced by considerations of an 
emotional character"/'^ At this point, in perhaps the most amazing sentence in the 
documentation, the Majority Report betrayed the hearing for the travesty that it was, saying 
that govemment officials "must be certain that underlying any advice is a genuine 
conviction that this country cannot in the interest of security have less than the strongest 
'^ Principal Documents, p. 22. 
^-Ibid., pp. 18-19. 
" Ibid., p. 20. 
" Ibid., p. 22. 
''Ibid., pp. 17-18. 
'^ Ibid p. 18. 
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possible offensive capabilities."^^ Thus a loyal, valuable and discreet citizen can be 
considered a security risk if his opinions do not reflect official views, in this case the view 
that national security can only be based on the preservation of the "strongest possible 
offensive capabilities" This point was later reiterated and connected to the issue of 
Oppenheimer's influence. The report said: 
We are concerned.. that he [Oppenheimer] may have departed his role as scientific 
advisor to exercise highly persuasive influence in matters in which his convictions 
were not necessarily a reflection of technical judgement, and also not necessarily 
related to the protection of the strongest offensive military interests of the country. 
It seems clear, despite denials, that Oppenheimer was being put on trial because he was 
seen as an influential man whose opinions conflicted with official views. 
The Board did not stop here. In discussing the "controlling considerations" that led 
to their conclusions, the majority said that they found Oppenheimer's conduct in the 
hydrogen bomb program "sufficiently disturbing as to raise doubts as to whether his future 
participation, if characterized by the same attitudes in Govemment program relating to the 
national defense, would be clearly consistent with the best interests of security." 
Oppenheimer was not only being condemned for his past opinions, but the board, judging 
from what they knew of Oppenheimer's character, presumed to discern his future opinions 
and condemn them in advance. The Report also discussed Oppenheimer's lack of 
"enthusiastic support of the securhy system," mentioning how he "repeatedly exercised an 
arrogance of his own judgement" when it came to the loyalty and reliability of others.'**^  
Due to these considerations, as well as those mentioned above, the Board reached the 
conclusion that it would not be "clearly consistent with the security interests of the United 
States to reinstate Dr. Oppenheimer's clearance" "" Such were the findings of the majority 
of the Gray Board. It was recommended that Oppenheimer, a loyal and unusually discreet 
individual, should be denied clearance due to, among other things, his "judgement," 
"influence," "arrogance" and lack of "enthusiasm" It seems clear then, that Oppenheimer 
was being removed, not because he was a security risk as we would commonly understand 
' Principal Documents, p. \%. 
'^ Ibid., p. 20. 
'"^ Ibid..p.2\. 
^Ibid. p. 20. 
'' Ibid 
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it, but because, in the past, he had caused trouble for those in power, and given his 
character, was likely to do so again in the future. 
Things did not stop here, next came the separate finding of AEC General Manager, 
K. D. Nichols. Nichols belabored Oppenheimer's Communist connections, saying that 
Oppenheimer was more than a simple "parlor pink," though he admitted that there was "no 
direct evidence that Dr. Oppenheimer gave secrets to a foreign nation or that he is 
disloyal".'*^ Nichols, like the majority of the Gray Board, argued that Oppenheimer 
"repeatedly exercised an arrogance of his own judgement" when it came to the loyalty of 
his associates, and showed disregard for "a reasonable security system".'*^ In an apparent 
effort to ward off the criticism he received for including the H-bomb charge in his initial 
charges against Oppenheimer, Nichols said that "technical opinions have no security 
implications unless they are a reflections of sinister motives." '^ He later said that the 
record cleared Oppenheimer of such motives. However, two sentences later, Nichols 
seemed to retreat from this position, discussing the negative impacts of Oppenheimer's 
influence. He said that had Oppenheimer "given his enthusiastic support to the [H-bomb] 
program, a concerted effort would have been initiated at an earlier date, and that, whatever 
the motivation, the security interests of the United States were affected."'*' 
After Nichols had given his conclusions, the final resolution of the case was handed 
over to five men at the AEC. These men were Lewis L. Strauss, Joseph Campbell, Thomas 
Murray, Eugene Zuckert, and Henry DeWolf Smyth. The Commission voted four-to-one to 
deny Oppenheimer clearance. Each one of the Commissioners wrote an opinion, with the 
majority opinion, signed by Strauss, Campbell and Zuckert, being authored by Strauss.'*^ 
Murray concurred with the majority conclusions, but for different reasons, and Smyth 
dissented. The various statements put forward by the AEC commissiontrs not only 
contradicted the Gray Board, but at times contradicted each other. 
Zuckert's opinion offers valuable insight into why Oppenheimer's clearance was not 
simply allowed to lapse, thus avoiding an ugly hearing. He declared that such a possibility 
""^  Principal Documents, p. 44. 
•'^  Ibid., p. 46. 
•" Ibid., p. 47. 
45 
''Ibid 
"* Charles P. Curtis, The Oppenheimer Case: The Trial of a Security System (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1955), p. 239. 
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was "not practical," going into a rather long-winded explanation as to why this was so. 
Zuckert discussed Oppenheimer's influence, saying: 
His advice was sought on many matters in which science or technical aspects of 
atomic energy were important as incidentals and background. With his unique 
experience, his intellect, his breadth of interests and his articulateness it was almost 
inevitable that he was consulted on a growing number of national security policy 
matters.'*^ 
Thus Zuckert shows Oppenheimer's influence to be the "almost inevitable" resuk of various 
aspects of Oppenheimer's character. He then stmck to the heart of the issue, saying that 
ahhough the Commission had used Oppenheimer very little after 1952, Commission 
clearance had, however, "been a basis for other agencies using him in coimection with 
delicate problems of national security [and] it is logical to expect that would continue.""*^ 
Zuckert said the Commission was "clearly obligated to determine" whether Oppenheimer 
could go on being used and consuhed by other agencies. Thus once again there was a 
concem not only for Oppenheimer's current role, but that of his future role. As has already 
been discussed, Oppenheimer was being removed primarily due to the opinions he held and 
the influence he wielded. What Zuckert was saying, was that if Oppenheimer's clearance 
was simply allowed to lapse, his influence would not be destroyed and his opinions would 
not be silenced. 
The most important report by the AEC is the majority report. The majority opinion 
concluded that Oppenheimer was not "entitled to the continued confidence of the 
Govemment and of this Commission because of the proof of fiindamental defects in his 
'character."''° To support this conclusion, Strauss cited six examples, half of which 
occurred before his 1947 clearance of Oppenheimer. After discussing his six examples, 
Strauss went on to say "the catalogue does not begin and end with these six examples," 
suggesting other events had been considered in reaching this judgement.'^ At the end of the 
majority statement, Strauss wrote: 
It is clear that for one who has had access for so long to the most vital defense 
secrets of the Govemment and who would retain such access if his clearance were 
Principal Documents, p. 56. 
Ibid 
47 
''Ibid 
'^ Ibid., p. 51 
'° Ibid., p. 51. 
'^ Ibid., p. 53. 
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obligations that should and must be willingly bome by citizens in national service. 
Strauss did not mention the fact that Oppenheimer had never, during the "long" years he 
had held clearance, betrayed any of the "vital secrets" mentioned. Oppenheimer was to be 
considered a security risk simply because he was of "bad character" In his dissenting 
opinion, Smyth would raise questions about quality of Strauss' judgement and his role in 
the origins of the hearing. 
Smyth's dissenting opinion is one of the most enlightening documents of the case, 
for it serves to point out many of the inconsistencies and injustices in the hearing. Smyth 
said "the only question being determined by the Atomic Energy Commission is whether 
there is a possibility that Dr. Oppenheimer will intentionally or unintentionally reveal 
information to persons who should not have it,...this is what is meant within our security 
system by the term security risk."^^ Later in his dissenting opinion he went on to clarify this 
point further, saying that "if a man protects the secrets he has in his hands and his head, he 
has shown essential regard for the security system."^"* It is clear that Smyth did not accept 
the way the term "security risk" had been redefined to suit the needs of Oppenheimer's 
enemies. Smyth went on to say: 
I frankly do not understand the charge made by the majority that Dr. Oppenheimer 
has shown a persistent and willful disregard for the obligations of security, and that 
therefore he should be declared a security risk. No gymnastics of rationalization 
allow me to accept this argument.^^ 
Smyth also pointed out the lack of new evidence and hinted at the forces behind the 
reopening of old questions surrounding Oppenheimer's loyalty. 
The past 15 years of his [Oppenheimer's] life have been investigated and 
reinvestigated. For much of the last 11 years he has been under actual surveillance, 
his movements watched, his conversations noted, his mail and telephone calls 
checked. This professional review of his actions has been supplemented by 
enthusiastic amateur help from powerful personal enemies.^^ (Emphasis added.) 
'- Principal
 Documents, p. 54. 
'^ Ibid., p. 64. 
'Ubid.,p.61 
''Ibid 
'Ubid., p. 64. 
21 
Smyth later recalled that this last comment had been provoked by reports in the 
Oppenheimer file, which he said, originated from "such avid and skeptical Oppenheimer-
watchers as Lewis Strauss, William Borden, David Griggs and, to a lesser extent, Edward 
Teller." Such men did not like Oppenheimer's influential views, and hoped to silence 
such an influential source of unwelcome advice.. 
As mentioned, Smyth not only questioned Strauss' role in the origins of the 
Oppenheimer hearing, but also questioned his veracity. In support of his conclusion that 
Oppenheimer had fundamental defects of character, Strauss cited six examples, but said, 
"the catalogue does not begin and end with these six examples. "^ ^ In his dissenting opinion, 
Smyth, who had access to the same files as Strauss, said of these six examples: "any 
implication that these are illustrations only and that further substantial evidence exists in 
the investigative files to support these charges is unfounded."^^ Smyth quoted the AEC 
security criteria, which said that the decision as to security clearance was "an overall 
commonsense judgement," and went on to say that the application of this standard to the 
Oppenheimer record, "destroys any pattem of suspicious conduct or catalog of falsehoods 
and evasions, and leaves a picture of Dr. Oppenheimer as an able, imaginative human being 
whh normal human weaknesses and failings."^" In his dissenting opinion Smyth was direct 
in pointing out the injustice of the Oppenheimer hearing, at one point simply saying, "the 
conclusion [of the majority] cannot be supported by a fair evaluation of the evidence."^^ It 
seems clear that little about the Oppenheimer hearing was "fair". 
After one peels away the contradictions and inconsistencies of the Oppenheimer 
hearing, the tme issues involved become discemible. The ostensible concem behind the 
hearing was Oppenheimer's opposition to the H-bomb and the security risk inherent in his 
former Communist "associations". However, it soon became clear that this issue of 
"associations" did not carry the importance that the charges first indicated. The Gray Board 
openly attested to Oppenheimer's loyahy and discretion, and none feh Oppenheimer would 
betray govemment secrets. Many commentators and scholars concluded that Oppenheimer 
was tried for his opinions, but the case is not that simple. Though scholarship on the subject 
"^  Stem. The Oppenheimer Case: Security on Trial, p. 419. 
"^* Principal Documents, p. 53. 
'Ubid.. p. 66. 
^ Ibid., p. 61. 
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seems to have unanimously rejected Strauss' conclusion that Oppenheimer was in fact 
removed due to "fundamental defects in his character", Strauss was in a way correct. A 
study of the hearing reveals that h was in fact Oppenheimer's character that cost him his 
security clearance. 
Throughout the hearing various aspects of Oppenheimer's character were studied 
and discussed. The principal AEC witnesses, under direction from the "prosecution", 
discussed Oppenheimer's opinions and influence, and the dangers these posed to the 
security of the United States. The testimony is littered with issues such as Oppenheimer's 
wisdom and judgement, his command of the English language and powers of persuasion, 
his morality and his lack of enthusiasm. The prosecution portrayed each one of these facets 
of Oppenheimer's character as constituting a security risk, and it is clear that such issues 
were decisive in the final outcome. Though study of the documentation reveals that it was 
indeed Oppenheimer's character that led to the removal of his security clearance, it does not 
reveal how it did so. For a better understanding of how Oppenheimer's character led to the 
loss of his securhy clearance, one must study the origins and nature of Oppenheimer's 
character, and his changing role in the years leading to the hearing. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE EMERGENCE OF A 
SCIENTIST. 
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J. Robert Oppenheimer was bom to Julius and Ella Oppenheimer on April 22, 
1904. Julius Oppenheimer was a prosperous German-Jewish emigrant who directed a 
cloth-importing company. Ella was from a prosperous American family of German descent. 
When she met Julius Oppenheimer she had already begun to make a name for herself as a 
painter of some distinction and an art teacher with her own studio in Manhattan.^ Julius and 
Ella Oppenheimer were people of digmty. Visitors to the Oppenheimer home found the 
atmosphere subdued and correct, like an elegant restaurant.^ Julius Oppenheimer was 
devoted to matters of the mind and more than anything he enjoyed lively discussions on 
philosophy or ethics."* Both Julius and Ella Oppenheimer were non-practicing Jews, and 
did not belong to any temple. Instead they were part of the Ethical Culture Society. This 
society was founded by Felix Adler, the son of a German rabbi, and promoted the idea of a 
society based on ethics rather than religion. Members preached of the need for stronger 
moraUty, but believed morality should not be based on religious dogma. They feh that 
people could develop values that would allow them to live and die with dignity, without the 
aid of religious institutions. Such ideas were ingrained in the young Oppenheimer. 
From second grade through high school, Oppenheimer attended the Ethical Culture 
School on Central Park West, which had grown out of the Ethical Culture Society. This 
school offered a new kind of education, not only teaching "the three R's" but also courses 
in areas such as craft and art, geography, history, nature study, the writing of original 
composhions, and most of all ethics. "Moral law" was taught in all grades, firstly through 
the study of fairytales, then later through the study of history, the Old and New Testament 
and classics such as the Odyssey.^ One of Oppenheimer's cousins once said of the Ethical 
Culture School: "If there ever was an outfit where ethics and honesty and morals were 
stressed, that was h!"^ 
' Whetlier or not the "J" in Robert's name stood for Julius has never been fully resolved. Official 
communications by FBI director J.Edgar Hoover as well as the 1968 book Lawrence and Oppenheimer, by 
Nuel Pharr Davis, referred to him as "Julius Robert Oppenheimer." The City of New York Bureau of Records 
and Statistics said the city records "contain a birth certiJBcate for a Julius R. Oppenheimer." However, Robert 
himself always maintained that the " f stood "for nothing" 
- Jack Rummel. Robert Oppenheimer: Dark Prince (New York: Facts on File, 1992), p. 16. 
^ .Mice Kimball Smith and Charles Weiner, eds., Robert Oppenheimer: Letters and Recollections (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1980). p. 2. 
' Denise Royal. The Story of J Robert Oppenheimer (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969), p. 5. 
' Rummel, Robert Oppenheimer: Dark Prince, p 19. 
^ PhiUp M. Stem, The Oppenheimer Case: Security on Trial (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), p. 10. 
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Ethical Culture School had a profound and lasting effect on Oppenheimer. His 
approach to people and problems and the great weight he laid on moral and ethical 
considerations can be traced back to the philosophy of his parents and that of the Ethical 
Cuhure School. Oppenheimer later had great difficuhy in reconciling the strong moral 
values this school had imbued in him whh his central role in ushering in the nuclear age. He 
would view the debates that the nuclear age engendered, such as the one that surrounded 
the H-bomb decision, in a moralistic manner. Oppenheimer's moralistic approach to post-
war problems became increasingly out of step whh that of the defense establishment. This 
divergence of views and approaches was a primary factor in Oppenheimer's later removal. 
At school, Oppenheimer excelled. However, though he was far ahead of his peers 
intellectually, he was emotionally immature, never developing normal social skills. Jane 
Kayser, one of his classmates, remembered the teenage Oppenheimer as someone who 
"never wanted to come to the front of anything...If he did h was because he was so 
extraordinarily gifted and brilliant - that just pushed him."^ This is also tme of 
Oppenheimer's later life, it seems his brilliance, combined whh his strong morals, "just 
pushed him." After the end of the war, when Oppenheimer entered into various advisory 
roles, he recognized many of the problems that were inherent in the new nuclear age, 
problems that others had not yet recognized, and feh it was his moral obligation to see that 
these problems were addressed. Oppenheimer was perhaps the first to recognize the tmly 
revolutionary nature of nuclear weapons and the resulting inapplicability of traditional 
military and political thought. Unfortunately for Oppenheimer, many of the problems that 
he was to recognize and draw attention to, ahhough real, were problems that the country 
was not yet willing to face or openly discuss. 
Oppenheimer, even in his childhood, suffered from bouts of depression, coupled 
with a type of self-destmctive introspection. Depression would particularly trouble him 
throughout his school and university life. In 1963, Oppenheimer would say: 
Up to now, and even more in the days of my almost infinitely prolonged 
adolescence, I hardly took an action, hardly did anything or failed to do 
anything, whether h was a paper in physics, or a lecture, or how I read a 
book, how I talked to a friend, how I loved, that did not arouse in me a very 
great sense of revulsion and of wrong. 
Smith and Weiner. Robert Oppenheimer: Letters and Recollections, p. 1. 
Howard Gardner, Leading Minds: An Anatomy of Leadership (New York: Basic Books, 1995), p. 92. 
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Nothing in his later life aroused a greater sense of "revulsion and wrong" than his 
connection whh the A-bomb project. During his univershy years Oppenheimer would tell a 
friend: "The kind of person that I admire most would be one who becomes extraordmarily 
good at doing a lot of things but still maintains a tear-stained countenance."^ Oppenheimer 
did become extraordinarily good at a number of things, but after the creation of the A-bomb 
he feh that he had "blood on his hands."^° 
Oppenheimer entered Harvard in 1922, completing the four-year course in just three 
years, graduating summa cum laude. At Harvard the tartness and arrogance that were to 
later become more pronounced, and which were to play an integral role in his later troubles, 
began to manifest themselves. During a vish to the home of physics professor Percy 
Bridgman, Oppenheimer noticed a photograph of a temple at Segesta, Sicily. Bridgman 
remarked that it had been built in 700BC, to which Oppenheimer responded: "I should 
judge from the caphals on the columns that it was built about fifty years earlier."" 
Oppenheimer could be extremely cutting, and would cut someone mid-conversation if he 
thought they were cmde or banal. "That boy will either shake up physics or the world," 
Bridgman said of Oppenheimer. In reality that "boy" was to shake up both. 
After graduating from Harvard, Oppenheimer applied to the Univershy of 
Cambridge, where he worked with the famous physicist. Sir Joseph J. Thomson at the 
Cavendish laboratory. Oppenheimer was awkward in the laboratory, and the simple act of 
soldering two wires together fiixstrated him. By Christmas of 1925, Oppenheimer had once 
again sunk into the depths of depression, deciding to take a holiday to Britain and France. 
He walked along the seashore and thought of suicide, later saying: "I was on the point of 
bumping myself off. This was chronic."^^ One of Oppenheimer's friends, John Edsall, 
recalled that it was obvious that in Oppenheimer "there was a tremendous inner turmoil, in 
sphe of which...he kept on doing a tremendous amount of work, thinking, reading, 
discussing things, but obviously whh a sense of great inner anxiety and alarm."'"* It seems 
that throughout his life Oppenheimer would agonize over decisions and actions he had 
^ Smith and Weiner, Robert Oppenheimer: Letters and Recollections, p. 93. 
"^  Oppenheimer, in a meeting with Dean Acheson and President Truman, very much offended Truman by 
saying, in connection with his role in the production of the A-bomb, "Mr. President, I have blood on my 
hands." See Stem, The Oppenheimer Case: Security on Trial, p. 90. 
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'• J. Alvin Kugelmass, J. Robert Oppenheimer and the Atomic Story (New York: Julian Messner, 1961), p. 42. 
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taken, never sure if what he was doing was ethical or right. Nothing would come to torment 
him more than the moral questions surrounding his role in the Manhattan Project, and his 
later life would be dedicated to righting what he conceived of as a terrible sin. 
Though Oppenheimer was having great difficulties whh laboratory work, he was 
making a name for himself in theoretical physics. Oppenheimer decided to take an offer to 
work in Germany. The offer came from Max Bom, director of the Institute of Theoretical 
Physics at the University of Gottingen in Germany. Oppenheimer could not have picked a 
more interesting time to make this transition, for early that year (1926), Erwin Schrodinger 
had proposed a revolutionary new theory of the atom, called quantum mechanics. 
Oppenheimer had already written two papers on various aspect of Quantum Theory, which 
had been published by the Joumal of the Cambridge Philosophical Society. Because of this, 
Oppenheimer's reputation preceded him to Gottingen, and he was immediately accepted 
into the weekly staff and student seminars as a member of some standing, though he was 
one of the youngest on the scene. ^ ^ 
The relationship between teacher and pupil was close at Cambridge, but this did not 
compare to the situation at Gottingen. Quantum mechanics was a new field, where students 
and professors learned from one another. The professors did not make secrets of their 
mistakes and doubts, and prompted students to seek out their own explanations. '^  Gottingen 
at that time was the epitome of the intemational world of science at its best. Here, tmth was 
the only goal, rationality was the only method, and the process of discovery was imminent 
and endless. Here h was feh that the responsibility of scientific mind was to "challenge and 
test all doctrine, to expose all views, discuss all possibilhies, and reject all errors in the free 
air of open debate."'^ This is the atmosphere in which Oppenheimer matured, and this was 
the kind of scientific mindset instilled in Oppenheimer. Hans Bethe later said: "Vigorous 
discussion as well as emphasis on fundamental problems was Oppenheimer's style... 
Perhaps he wanted to perpetuate that feeling of continuous discovery which must have 
pervaded Gottingen."^^ Later Oppenheimer would bring this mindset and approach to his 
post-war advisory roles. When Oppenheimer entered policy-making circles, his ideas about 
international openness and free debate brought him into sharp conflict with much of the 
'^  Rebecca Larsoa Oppenheimer and the Atomic Bomb (New York: Franklin Watts, 1988), p. 27. 
'^  Royal, The Story of J Robert Oppenheimer, p. 38. 
'^  Thomas W. Wilson, The Great Weapons Heresy (Boston: Houghton Mifilin, 1970), p. 3. 
'^  Hans Bethe, "Oppenheimer: 'Where He Was There Was Always Life and Excitement'" Science, 155 
(March 1967), p. 1081. 
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defense establishment, which equated knowledge whh power and believed secrecy was 
essential to nuclear supremacy. 
In his student days, Oppenheimer's brilliance led many students to dislike him. 
Fellow American student Ed Condon said: "the trouble is that Oppie is so quick on the 
trigger intellectually that he puts the other guy at a disadvantage. And, dammit, he is always 
right, or at least right enough."^^ Oppenheimer was also weahhy, arrogant and cultivated. 
Condon recalled one incident that illustrated just how sheltered and elitist Oppenheimer's 
early life had been. Oppenheimer had invhed Ed Condon and his wife Emilie out for a 
walk, but Emilie was forced to refiise because she had to look after the couple's new baby. 
"All right," Oppenheimer replied, "we'll leave you to your peasant tasks."^° As mentioned 
before, such arrogance would earn Oppenheimer powerfiil enemies. 
On May 11, 1927, after some difficuhies whh the Pmssian Ministry of education, 
Oppenheimer was allowed to take his oral examination. After the examination the physicist 
James Franck was asked how it had gone by a colleague; he replied "I got out of there just 
in time. He was beginning to ask me questions."^' Oppenheimer next became a Fellow of 
the National Research Council, first at Harvard, then at the California Institute of 
Technology. In 1928 Oppenheimer became a Fellow of the Intemational Education Board, 
visiting Leiden and Zurich. At the University of Leiden, Oppenheimer stutmed staff and 
students by delivering a lecture in Dutch after having been there only six weeks. It is here 
that Oppenheimer gained the affectionate nickname "Opje", which would become "Oppie" 
in the Umted States. Throughout his time in Europe, h seems that Oppenheimer was 
homesick and even a little chauvinistic, often infiiriating other students with superlatives 
about the Unhed States. One student remarked: "According to him, even the flowers 
seemed to smell better back there." Oppenheimer later wrote: 
In the spring of 1929 I retumed to the United States. I was homesick for this 
country, and in fact I did not leave h for nineteen years. I had leamed a great 
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deal in my student days about the new physics; I wanted to pursue this 
myself, to explain h, and to foster hs cuhivation...^'^ 
This is exactly what Oppenheimer was to do. Over the next ten years, beginning with a 
single graduate student, Oppenheimer tumed Califomia into a great center for theoretical 
physics. 
Oppenheimer chose concurrent appointments as an assistant professor at the 
California Institute of Technology (Cal Tech) and at the University of Califomia at 
Berkeley. In his early days of teaching, Oppenheimer is alleged to have "terrorized" his 
students. He was a poor lecturer who raced through his notes, often spoke in abstract prose, 
and vastly overestimated the abilities of his audience. After one of his early lectures a 
professor congratulated Oppenheimer by saying, "Well, Robert, I didn't understand a damn 
word!"^^ Eventually Oppenheimer slowed down his lectures and improved his delivery, and 
soon attracted a devout following of particularly gifted students. Oppenheimer's charming 
and magnetic personality was instmmental in his great success as a teacher. Glenn Seaborg 
said of Oppenheimer: "his electric personality certainly contributed to our fascination and 
satisfaction with his performance." Various people have tried to explain Oppenheimer's 
unusual abiUty to influence people, speculating as to what unique personal quaUty he 
possessed that allowed him to so easily command, persuade and influence. Philosopher 
Will Dennes, who knew Oppenheimer for many years, answered this question with one 
word: "Charisma."^^ Oppenheimer's unusual ability to influence people was also given 
mention in his hearing and was an important factor in his removal. This ability gave him 
power and influence beyond that which someone would normally command in his position. 
Those that disagreed with his ideas and advice found him all the more threatening due to 
his influential nature. 
For all his charisma, there was also a very harsh and sometimes cmel side to 
Oppenheimer's personalhy. Oppenheimer was an intellectual snob, who would often 
criticize those who did not meet his high standards. One student recalls how Oppenheimer 
"could be, and often was, a rough person to have in the audience when giving a lecture. 
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Frequently he'd take the speaker apart verbally."^^ Oppenheimer was not afraid to intermpt 
or contradict speakers; even the great minds of physics fell prey to such attacks. 
Oppenheimer is reported to have intermpted several lecturers with caustic comments such 
as "Oh, come now! We all know that. Let's get on whh h," or "That is totally incorrect and 
you should know better."^^ On one occasion, one of Oppenheimer's former professors, the 
elderly James Franck, a warm and kindly grandfather figure, vished Berkeley to deliver a 
series of lectures on which someone had bestowed the grandiose title, "The Fundamental 
Meaning of Quantum Mechanics."^" As part of his vish, Franck attended a particularly 
advanced lecture delivered by one of Oppenheimer's prize students. From the audience 
Franck asked a question that seemed foolish to many others in the room. "Well," 
Oppenheimer said caustically from the audience, "I don't intend to deliver any lectures on 
'The Fundamental Meaning of Quantum Mechanics,' but part of the meaning is that that 
question is a foolish one."^^ James Franck was nehher in a position, nor of a mind, to 
injure Oppenheimer. Others however, who were later humiliated by Oppenheimer's tongue, 
were in such positions, and were to be instmmental in the removal of his security clearance. 
On another occasion the distinguished Japanese scientist, Hideki Yukawa, came to 
Berkeley and addressed Oppenheimer's group on his latest discovery, the meson. Yukawa 
was only a few minutes into his talk when Oppenheimer intermpted and finished the 
presentation himself ^^  Yukawa seems to have been the only one who thought this mde. 
The others in the room simply assumed that Oppenheimer was better at understanding and 
communicating ideas than an original researcher. It was certainly tme that Oppenheimer 
greatest ability was in pointing out the mistakes of others. For this very reason, a number of 
physicists from around the world had Oppenheimer check their calculations for mistakes. 
Oppenheimer had a tremendous abilhy to highlight the key components of other people's 
theories, and put them in such simple language that any problems became immediately 
apparent. These skills later played a vhal role in Oppenheimer's successfiil directorship of 
the Los Alamos laboratory. However, when Oppenheimer later pointed out the key flaws in 
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the defense establishment's approach to the nuclear age, particularly that of the Strategic 
Air Command, he helped pave the way for his removal. 
Until the mid-1930s Oppenheimer seems to have been completely caught up in 
university life and the world of physics. His friends were mostly faculty members, 
scientists and artists. He was, by his own admission, almost completely divorced from the 
contemporary social or polhical scene.^ ^ "What does polhics have to do with tmth, 
goodness, and beauty?" a fiiend remembers Oppenheimer saying.^ "* Oppenheimer did not 
read newspapers or popular magazines, had no radio or telephone, and only leamed of the 
stock market crash of 1929 long after the event. Oppenheimer later said of this period: "I 
was interested in man and his experience; I was deeply interested in my science; but I had 
no understanding of the relations of man to his society."^^ However, 1936 was to mark the 
beginning of Oppenheimer's political awakening. Wedding his early Ethical Culture 
Society concerns with a growing anxiety about the turbulent world around him, 
Oppenheimer unquestionably became a man of the left. The left-wing "associations" he 
made in the 1930s were later resurrected and used to trigger the hearing that resulted in the 
removal of his security clearance. 
Two issues in particular were responsible for Oppenheimer's political and social 
awakening. The first was the rise of Fascism and Nazism abroad. Oppenheimer had what he 
described as a "continuing, smoldering fiiry about the treatment of the Jews in Germany."^^ 
Oppenheimer had relatives in Germany, whom he later helped to immigrate to America. 
The Depression provided the second factor in Oppenheimer's awakening. Though 
Oppenheimer was quite financially secure himself, he witnessed the effects of the 
Depression on his students, who either could not get jobs at all or could only get jobs that 
were completely inadequate. Oppenheimer later said of his students: "through them, I 
began to understand how deeply political and economic events could affect men's lives. I 
began to feel the need to participate more fiilly in the life of the communhy."^^ 
Oppenheimer's political and social awakening had a quality of immature 
susceptibility to it. Due to his political ignorance he was particularly malleable for a man 
^^  Transcript, p. 8. 
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his age, and largely allowed others to shape his political and social activism.^^ In 1936 
Oppenheimer made a number of polhically active friends and soon became involved in 
such groups as the Friends of Chinese People, the Westem Council Consumers' Union, the 
American Commhtee for Democracy and Intellectual Freedom, and the Califomia Teachers 
Union, local 349. What most engaged Oppenheimer's sympathies and interests was the war 
in Spain. He later said that the defeat of the Loyalists caused him "great sorrow." 
Oppenheimer gave large sums of money to Dr. Thomas Addis, believing that this money 
went towards the fighting effort through Communist channels. It is important to point out 
that Oppenheimer, though he may have had numerous connections whh Communists, was 
never a member of the Communist party. Oppenheimer, h seems, feh morally obligated to 
not only help the fight against fascism, but to help those less fortunate groups feeling the 
effects of the Depression. Oppenheimer was not a Communist, but the Communist Party 
was a vehicle through which Oppenheimer feh he could discharge his moral duty. 
The fact that Oppenheimer had Communists connections did not raise any eyebrows 
in the mid-1930s. In 1936, when Oppenheimer cast his first vote for President, no less than 
eighty thousand Americans voted in favor of putting a Communist in the White House.'*^ 
American Communists were not shunned and quarantined like lepers at this time, as they 
would be in later decades. The level of public acceptance was such that both the 
Republicans and the Democrats, at one time or another, formed polhical alliances with the 
Communist Party. For example, in California in 1939, the Democratic Congressman, Clyde 
Doyle, thought nothing of sitting down with leading Califoraian Communists to plan a 
campaign to elect a Democratic Govemor. A decade later, this same individual was a 
member of the anti-Communist House Un-American Activities Committee. 
From 1938-40 Oppenheimer moved away from the Communist Party. By 1938 
Oppenheimer met three physicists that had actually lived in Russia in the thirties, Placzek, 
Weisskopf, and Schein. They told Oppenheimer of the purges, the bad management and the 
terror, and what they said seemed "so solid, so unfanatical, so tme, that h made a great 
impression."'*' The Nazi-Soviet Pact and the behavior of the Soviets in Poland and Finland 
reinforced this negative impression of the Soviet Union. Oppenheimer was also deeply 
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distressed by the fall of France. Bethe recalled how Oppenheimer spoke long and 
eloquently about the terrible tragedy to Westem civilization that the fall of France 
represented."*^ During the summer and fall of 1940, whh France lost and Britain under 
bmtal air siege, and the Communists still anti-interventionist, Oppenheimer increasingly 
fell away from his associations with the Communist Party. He fell away from the 
Communists because h became clear that they were no longer the moral champions he 
believed them to be. 
While Oppenheimer was dabbling in politics, important events were occurring in 
the world of science. In 1935, Frederic Joliot-Curie, upon receiving the Nobel Prize at 
Stockholm, made a prophetic statement. "We are justified in reflecting," he said, "that 
scientists who can constmct and demolish elements at will may also be capable of causing 
nuclear transformations of an explosive character. ""^ ^ By 1939, scientists around the world 
had become aware of the explosive potential of what had by that time been named "nuclear 
fission." In the United States, scientists had received indications that the Germans were 
taking the idea of a nuclear weapon very seriously. Fear of a Nazi A-bomb preciphated the 
now famous letter written to President Roosevelt by Leo Szilard and Albert Einstein, which 
in tum gave rise to the American nuclear weapons program. The American nuclear 
weapons program became known as the "Manhattan Engineering District," and after a 
number of fits and starts the actual design and constmction of the weapon was centralized 
in the Los Alamos Laboratory, New Mexico. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE ACTION: SCIENCE JOINS THE 
WAR EFFORT. 
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Oppenheimer was by no means an obvious choice for the poshion of director of the 
Los Alamos Laboratory. Many scientists opposed the appointment because Oppenheimer 
was not a Nobel Prize winner, he was not an experimental physicist, and he had almost no 
administrative experience.^ However when Groves asked if they had a better man for the 
job, the scientists agreed to Oppenheimer.^ Groves also met with resistance from security 
officials who were unwilling to clear Oppenheimer due to his former left-wing associations. 
Desphe such resistance. Groves feh Oppenheimer was the man for the job and personally 
wrote a letter to the District Engineer demanding Oppenheimer be given clearance, 
irrespective of any information that securhy officials had conceming him. Groves said that 
Oppenheimer was "absolutely essential to the project."^ 
From the outset there was enormous pressure on Oppenheimer. Initially the key 
problem was attracting the highest caliber scientists. What Oppenheimer was offering to 
such scientists was far from enticing. Los Alamos was situated in a remote desert, where 
scientists would live and work in rough, makeshift buildings."* They could not tell family or 
friends where they were going or what they were doing, and because of tight security, 
letters and phone calls were censored. They were seldom allowed to leave the site, and 
when they did it was a long trip via primhive and winding roads to the nearest city. On top 
of all this, scientists were expected to work very long hours on a project that seemed 
unlikely of success. This is what Oppenheimer had to offer the scientists he was trying to 
recmh, and Oppenheimer's persuasive gifts were taxed to their utmost. As he later pointed 
out, "the notion of disappearing into the New Mexico desert for an indeterminate period 
and under quasi military auspices disturbed a good many scientists, and the families of 
many more."^ 
This is where Oppenheimer's charisma proved invaluable. It seems that many 
agreed to Oppenheimer's request to come to Los Alamos for the simple reason that he was 
to be their director. The personal magnetism that he had hitherto only exercised upon his 
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students, now proved equally irresistible in wider circles. His great success in recmhing 
leading scientists was later attributed to "intellectual sex appeal."^ However, many also 
came because of the vision Oppenheimer painted of the Unhed States in a race against the 
Germans to develop the A-bomb, a race between good and evil. Bob Wilson later recalled 
Oppenheimer's attitude: 
He was convinced that the war effort was a mass effort to overthrow the 
Nazis and upset Fascism and he talked of a people's army and a people's 
war, as though it were a big indigenous upsurge. This also made his previous 
life plausible to us. The language had changed so Uttle. It's the same kind of 
language, except that now h had a patriotic flavour, whereas before h had 
just a radical flavour.^ 
This explains why Oppenheimer, an extraordinarily moral individual, oversaw the 
development of the most destmctive weapon the world had ever seen. He saw the project as 
a moral cmsade against evil and poured the same fervor he once poured into his political 
involvements into the building of the bomb. However, in light of later events and 
discoveries, Oppenheimer came to see his work at Los Alamos very differently. 
Oppenheimer's intellectual abilhies were perfectly suited for his role at Los 
Alamos. He was a genius at keeping in touch with the numerous technical problems facing 
various groups at Los Alamos. As George Kistiakowsky, chief of the explosives division at 
Los Alamos, later recalled, Oppenheimer "had an incredible ability to have all the threads 
of this enormous project in his mind and to make the right technical decisions." 
Oppenheimer's genius for finding other people's mistakes, and his ability to grasp other 
people's ideas and then clarify them, proved invaluable to the success at Los Alamos. 
Oppenheimer once joined a metallurgy session during an inconclusive argument over the 
type of container to be used for melting plutonium. Though Oppenheimer was a theoretical 
physicist, and this was far from familiar ground for him, he listened for a time and then 
summed up the discussion so clearly, that the answer, though not provided by 
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Oppenheimer, was immediately obvious.^ There are numerous other examples of 
Oppenheimer offering decisive input in various areas of the project. Even those that clashed 
with Oppenheimer conceded that the laboratory's success was largely due to his leadership. 
Edward Teller later said: "Los Alamos' success grew out of the brilliance, enthusiasm, and 
charisma with which Oppenheimer led h."^° 
There was however, vastly differing perceptions of Oppenheimer's personality. 
Joseph O. Hirschfelder, a group leader at Los Alamos, later recalled: "Oppenheimer would 
listen attentively, argue whh us, and sometimes dress us down whh clever and cutting 
sarcasm."'^ However not everyone was so understanding and forgiving of Oppenheimer's 
"cutting sarcasm." Hirschfelder went on to say: "We scientists regarded Oppenheimer as 
exceedingly clever when he cut us down with his sarcasm, but the milhary guys couldn't 
stand losing face and so there were a number of them... who were out to get him." Norris 
Bradbury, Oppenheimer's successor at Los Alamos, recalled that Oppenheimer aimed most 
of his verbal attacks at milhary officials. Colonel Kenneth Nichols, who would later 
become the general manager of the Atomic Energy Commission, was in particular "the butt 
1 "X 
of strong language from Oppie." Oppenheimer once again earned powerful enemies with 
his acerbic tongue, but this time such enemies had the power to damage, if not end, his 
career. In late 1953 and early 1954, Oppenheimer's enemies would exercise this power. 
The military was unhappy whh the way Oppenheimer organized Los Alamos. 
Oppenheimer had organized the laboratory along democratic lines. There was a Goveming 
Board that acted as a directorate for cooperative decision making, there was the Laboratory 
Coordinating Council, which was concerned whh administrative and social matters, and 
most importantly there was the colloquium. The colloquium was created as a fomm for the 
free exchange of ideas, and was open to any individuals with a scientific degree or 
equivalent experience.''^ Oppenheimer argued that there needed to be a fomm where 
everyone would have a chance to make contributions and where issues could be openly and 
freely debated. This reflected the ideas and mindset he had developed in his student days. 
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particularly at Gottingen. These ideas went directly against the concepts of 
compartmentalization and secrecy advocated by Groves and the military. The military did 
not like the prospect of such open discussion, for regular attendance of these meetings 
would give any participant a complete and detailed view of the atomic bomb. The 
colloquium was considered an invitation to security failures. 
During Oppenheimer's later hearing. Groves discussed how the scientists resisted 
compartmentalization, going on to say: "I never held this against them, because I knew that 
their whole lives from the time they entered college almost had been based on 
dissemination of knowledge."^^ Others whhin the military were not so understanding, yet 
Oppenheimer was allowed this freedom because of the urgency of the project and the fact 
that Oppenheimer himself was considered absolutely essential to hs success. However, 
when Oppenheimer later brought this same scientific mindset to post-war debates 
conceming nuclear weapons, and talked about the need for openness and the sharing of 
nuclear secrets, he was no longer the irreplaceable leader of a top-secret project, he was 
simply a noisy left-wing advisor. In the post-war years not only were Oppenheimer's views 
less acceptable, but he could be more easily removed or replaced. This proved to be a lethal 
combination for Oppenheimer's career in government. 
Everyone at Los Alamos worked under tremendous pressure, believing they were in 
a deadly race with the Germans. Elsie McMillan, who worked at Los Alamos with her 
husband Edwin, recalled the atmosphere at the laboratory: 
The emotional strain was apparent, the feeling that you've got to make that 
bomb, you've got to get h done; others are working on it; Germans are 
working on h; hurry! hurry! hurry! This is going to end the war; this is going 
to save our boys lives, this is going to save Japanese boys' lives; get that 
damn bomb done! We were tired, we were deathly tired."^^ 
The fact that the bomb was seen in such moral terms, as a way to save lives, made the work 
easier. However, by the end of the war, these noble ideas, which had motivated 
Oppenheimer and the other scientists to make the bomb, had all evaporated. 
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The first motivating factor to disappear was the threat of a German A-bomb. 
Following the surrender of Germany in May 1945, and the success of the Alsos mission to 
discover the level of German nuclear research, h became clear that German nuclear science 
was in a rather phifiil state.'^ Much has been wrhten about the impact of such news on 
nuclear scientists in America. It seems that this news led many scientists to raise questions 
about their work on the A-bomb. They were no longer in a desperate race against evil, but 
were simply working to add yet another, and even more deadly, weapon to the United 
States arsenal. However, news of the German surrender did not have the impact it might 
have, particularly whh regard to Oppenheimer. The German surrender coincided with the 
dress rehearsal for the Trinity test, which involved the detonation of a hundred tons of 
TNT.'^ At this time the scientists were working under tremendous pressure as they 
stmggled to meet the test date. This tension found expression in black humor, such as this 
poem that circulated in the tense weeks before Trinity: 
From this cmde lab that spawned a dud 
Their necks to Tmman's axe uncurled. 
Lo, the embattled savants stood 
And fired a flop heard around the world.'' 
Oppenheimer was racked with doubts, not about the morality of the bomb, that would come 
later, but about whether the thing would actually work. 
By the time the bomb was tested at Alamogordo, Los Alamos was three deep in 
experts, and many worried that Oppenheimer was going to have a breakdown. Groves even 
told Kenneth T. Bainbridge, who was in charge of the test, to keep Oppenheimer away from 
the tower and the bomb before the final test. Bainbridge refused to do this, believing that 
since the bomb was Oppenheimer's "baby," he should be allowed to follow its development 
to the very end. By this time Oppenheimer had lost several pounds off his already thin 
frame, chain smoked, and constantly coughed. He increasingly verbally attacked staff for 
incompetence. After one of the preliminary tests failed, Oppenheimer accused 
Kistiakowsky of failing the entire project. Kistiakowsky in tum bet Oppenheimer an entire 
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month's salary against ten dollars that the final test would work.^* By this time, not only 
did the scientists fear failure, some were beginning to fear success and the age that success 
would usher in. Though Oppenheimer and Niels Bohr did discuss the dangers of nuclear 
weapons, Oppenheimer's focus was primarily on the test. At 5:10 a.m., on Monday 
morning, 16 July 1945, when Sam Ellison broadcast over the loudspeaker system at Trinity, 
"Zero minus twenty minutes," Oppenheimer tumed to the officer next to him and said: 
"Lord, these affairs are hard on the heart."^^ 
At precisely 5:29:45 a.m. the months and years of intense effort culminated in the 
kindling of mankind's first nuclear fire, the dawn of the atomic age. A pinprick of brilliant 
light punctured the darkness, and for a fraction of a second that light was greater than any 
ever before produced on earth, and could have been seen from another planet.^^ 
Oppenheimer in that blinding instant thought of fragments from the Bhagavad Gita: 
If the radiance of a thousand suns 
Were to burst at once into the sky 
That would be like the splendor of Mighty One... 
And then, an instant later, as the bright light dimmed and the mushroom cloud formed: 
I am become Death 
The shatterer of worlds.^ "* 
The power that was released that day in the desert would later tear at Oppenheimer's 
conscience, and be, in some sense, the shatterer of his world. However, at the time, the test 
simply brought Oppenheimer a great sense of relief The tremendous sound of the 
explosion came a couple of minutes later. New York Times reporter William Laurence 
calling h "the first cry of a new-bora world."^^ Kistiakowsky ran up to Oppenheimer and 
slapped him on the back, saying, "Oppie, you owe me ten bucks."^^ Still shaken by the 
spectacular nature of the test, Oppenheimer opened his wallet and replied seriously, "It's 
empty, you'll have to wait," and the two men embraced. Kenneth Bainbridge shook 
"' George B. Kistiakowsky, "Reminiscences of Wartime Los Alamos", in Lawrence Badash, Joseph O. 
Hirschfelder and Herbert P. Broida, eds. Reminiscences of Los Alamos, 1943-1945 (Boston: D. Reidel, 1980), 
p. 60. 
" Lansing Lament, Day of Trinity (New York: Atheneum, 1%5) p. 226. 
''Ibid., p. 235. 
"Ibid 
" William L. Laurence, "Drama of the Atomic Bomb Found Climax in July 16 Test", New York Times, 26 
September 1945, p. 16. 
"* George B. Kistiakowsky, "Reminiscences of Wartime Los Alamos", in Lawrence Badash, Joseph O. 
Hirschfelder and Herbert P. Broida, eds, Reminiscences of Los Alamos, 1943-1945 (Boston: D. Reidel, 1980), 
p. 60. 
41 
Oppenheimer's hand and said "Oppie, now we're all sons of bhches." Oppenheimer 
would tell his younger daughter in 1966 that this was the most appropriate thing anyone 
had said after the test. 
The successful test filled Oppenheimer whh new confidence. He surprised everyone 
with a complete reversal of mood, retuming to his jaunty and energetic self. A little later 
when Rabi saw Oppenheimer for the first time since the test, his confident "high-noon 
stmt" gave Rabi gooseflesh.^^ "I'll never forget his walk," said Rabi, "I'll never forget the 
way he stepped out of the car."^' Whhin seventy-two hours, Washington began to heap 
praise on Oppenheimer and his staff Oppenheimer later said: "At the time, h was hard for 
us in Los Alamos not to share that satisfaction, and hard for me not to accept the conclusion 
that I had managed the enterprise well and played a key part in hs success."^^After the test 
there was tremendous excitement at Los Alamos, and staff partied well into the night. 
However, in the following few days the Los Alamos community experienced "a kind of 
cathartic shock."^* All those issues that the scientists had largely refused to face during the 
project now began to loom large. Many scientists now talked of little else but the role of the 
A-bomb in the post-war world. However, once again, Oppenheimer was too busy to 
contemplate such things. For him there was still the important task of preparing the bomb 
for use in Japan. 
Months earlier. Secretary of War Stimson and General Groves had briefed 
President Tmman on the atomic bomb project, and Tmman had approved the idea of an 
"Interim Committee" to formulate long-range plans for the use and control of nuclear 
power. The committee received advice from a scientific panel made up of Oppenheimer, 
Enrico Fermi, Arthur Compton, and Emest Lawrence. On May 31, the Interim Committee 
and the scientific panel had an all-day meeting to discuss how nuclear weapons should be 
controlled after the war, and the more immediate question of whether the A-bomb should 
be dropped on Japan.^^ During this meeting Oppenheimer argued that Russia had always 
^^ Kenneth T. Bainbridge, "All in Our Time: A Foul and Awesome display", p. 46. 
^ Gregg Herken, "Mad About the Bomb: The Inventors of Nuclear Weapons Gather for the Fortieth Reimion 
of GuiU and Pride", Harper's, 267 (December 1983), p. 49. 
'^ Goodchild, J. Robert Oppenheimer: 'Shatterer of Worlds', p. 162. 
°^ Transcript, p. 14. 
'^ Alice Kimball Smith, A Peril and a Hope: The Scientists' Movement in America, 1945-47 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 77. 
" "The Interim Committee minutes of May 31, 1945", reproduced in Phihp Cantelon, Richard Hewlett and 
Robert WilUams, eds. The American Atom: A Documentary History of Nuclear Policies from the Discovery of 
Fission to the Present (Philadelphia: University of Peimsylvania Press, 1991), p. 39-43. 
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been friendly to science, and should not be prejudged, suggesting that the Unhed States 
broach the subject of intemational collaboration and cooperation whh them. Several people 
agreed with Oppenheimer until Secretary of State James Byrnes joined the meeting late. 
Byrnes argued that the most desirable program would be to push ahead as fast as possible in 
nuclear research and weapons production in order to ensure that the United States stayed 
ahead of Russia. It was this approach, rather than Oppenheimer's, that the United States 
was to follow in the post-war years. Oppenheimer's ideas about intemational collaboration 
and the sharing of nuclear secrets would increasingly fall out of favor as the Cold War set 
in. His persistence in voicing such heretical ideas would be a key factor in his later 
removal. 
It is important to note however, that h was not Oppenheimer who advised that the 
bomb be used in some kind of demonstration. It was Emest Lawrence, who ironically was 
later to become one of the most zealous advocates of the vastly more destmctive H-bomb, 
that wanted to give the Japanese a demonstration of the A-bomb's power. Oppenheimer, on 
the contrary, seemed to feel that "an enormous nuclear firecracker detonated at a great 
height doing little damage" would not have convinced the Japanese to end the war.^ '* 
However, though the scientific panel later said that they saw "no direct alternative to 
military use," they admitted that they had "no claim to special competence in solving the 
political, social, and military problems which are presented by the advent of atomic 
power."^^ The committee eventually reached the generally agreed conclusion that the bomb 
should be used on Japan without prior warning and that the target should be a vital war 
plant surrounded by a civilian population.^ ^ 
Oppenheimer's attitude about the limited competence of scientists in political, 
social and military problems was the subject of an important conversation a month later 
between Oppenheimer and Edward Teller. This conversation rankled Teller for years to 
come and might well have been one of the factors behind his damning testimony at 
Oppenheimer's hearing. The conversation concerned a pethion that Szilard had asked 
Teller to support, which urged the Unhed States not to use the A-bomb whhout first 
'' Ibid., p. 42. 
'' Richard Rhodes. The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), p. 647. 
'' "Science Panel Recommendations on the Immediate Use of Nuclear Weapons, Jime 16,1945", reproduced 
in Cantelon. Hewlett and Williams, eds.. The American Atom: A Documentary History of Nuclear Policies 
from the Discovery of Fission to the Present, p. 47-48.. 
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waming the enemy. Teller was in absolute agreement with the petition and was prepared to 
circulate h at Los Alamos, but felt h was his duty to first discuss h with Oppenheimer.^^ 
Oppenheimer told Teller "that he thought it improper for a scientist to use his prestige as a 
platform for polhical pronouncements."^^ At the time Teller feh relieved, and decided to 
not circulate the pethion. However, when Oppenheimer later became involved in political 
circles and vehemently opposed Teller's "baby," the hydrogen bomb. Teller was infuriated 
and felt betrayed. However, it seems that at the time Oppenheimer meant what he said to 
Teller. This was before Oppenheimer, or anyone for that matter, fully understood the 
terrible destmction and loss of life that would result in the use of nuclear weapons. This 
was before Oppenheimer came to believe that scientists had committed a terrible sin in 
creating the A-bomb, and before Oppenheimer tried to make up for this sin by entering 
political circles in an attempt to tum nuclear power into a force for peace. 
Shortly after 8:00 a.m. on the moming of August 6, 1945, the bomb was detonated 
over Hiroshima and the world was introduced to the power of the atom. The bomb created 
the nightmarish scene that author John Hersey would later describe in Hiroshima^^ 
Estimates are still in dispute, but upward of 140,000 people died on the day of the attack 
and the weeks immediately following h. Groves called Oppenheimer on August 6 at 2:00 
p.m. to pass on the news and congratulate Oppenheimer and his people. "Everybody is 
feeling reasonably good about h," Oppenheimer replied."^" The physicist Otto Frisch 
remembers hearing people mnning and yelling about Hiroshima. "I still remember the 
feeling of unease, indeed nausea... h seemed rather ghoulish to celebrate the sudden death of 
a hundred thousand people, even if they were 'enemies,'" recalls Frisch."*^ It seems that 
Frisch was one of the first to feel the sense of horror and guilt that would come to infect a 
majorhy of the scientists that had worked on the bomb project. 
On the day of Hiroshima, Oppenheimer entered a giant meeting of clapping 
scientists assembled at the Los Alamos audhorium. The time for more somber assessment 
and reflection was not yet here, and Oppenheimer was caught up in the feeling of success. 
He proudly strode down the aisle and as he mounted the podium he clasped his hands over 
his head in a victory gesture. He informed his colleagues that an atomic bomb had been 
'^ Edward Teller, The Legacy of Hiroshima (London: Macmillan, 1962), p. 13. 
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successfully detonated over Hiroshima. Initially Oppenheimer had estimated that around 
twenty thousand Japanese would die in such an attack, but it soon became clear that deaths 
would far exceed that number. As after the Trinity test, a party was organized at one of the 
men's dormhories. However most people did not come and many of those who did, beat a 
hasty retreat. Those that did attend, quietly talked and sipped drinks as feelings about the 
day's events tumed sour. In one comer Oppenheimer showed a colleague a telex that had 
arrived from Washington with details of the damage at Hiroshima. Both became upset by 
the news and went home. When returning home Oppenheimer spotted a sober and usually 
cool-headed group leader vomhing in the bushes, and thought to himself "The reaction has 
begun."^' 
42 Smith and Weiner, Robert Oppenheimer: Letters and Recollections, p. 292. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE REACTION: SCIENCE AND 
POLITICS CONVERGE. 
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When victory over Japan was announced, Los Alamos celebrated whh as much 
verve as it could muster. Now that their secret was out, the staff at Los Alamos were 
praised as heroes. Congratulatory letters and telegrams began to flood in from all over the 
country, and many scientists received medals or letters of merit. But VJ day also brought 
increased reflection about the use of the A-bomb. Laura Fermi, wife of Enrico Fermi, 
recalled: 
When among the praising voices some arose that deprecated the bomb, and words 
like 'barbarism,' 'horror,' 'the crime of Hiroshima,' 'the mass murder,' were heard 
from several directions, the wives sobered. They wondered, they probed their 
consciences, but found no answers to their doubts.^  
The scientists themselves were filled with even greater doubts about the A-bomb, none 
more so than Oppenheimer himself On 26 August 1945, in a letter to his old friend Herbert 
Smith, Oppenheimer said of the A-bomb project: "You will believe that this undertaking 
has not been without its misgivings; they are heavy on us today, when the future, which has 
so many elements of high promise, is yet only a stone's throw from despair."^ 
Oppenheimer arranged to leave his poshion at Los Alamos and retum to academic 
life immediately after a ceremony on 16 October, where Groves presented the laboratory 
with a Certificate of Appreciation on behalf of the Army. But Oppenheimer's retum to 
teaching was no more than a gesture, for he felt a moral obligation to help address the 
problems of the nuclear age. In the course of his later security hearing, Oppenheimer said: 
"I felt, perhaps quite strongly, that having played an active part in promoting a revolution in 
warfare, I needed to be as responsible as I could with regard to what came of this 
revolution."^ Oppenheimer was no longer some obscure scientist; the spectacular success of 
the A-bomb had tumed him into a well-known and respected public figure. This public 
notoriety, combined whh his already high standing among scientists, gave Oppenheimer a 
good deal of personal and political influence. 
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Oppenheimer was soon called to Washington to help develop a plan for postwar 
control of the atom, becoming one of the primary authors of the Acheson-Lilienthal Report. 
This report was a radical polhical response to a radical breakthrough in science. It proposed 
the creation of a supranational Atomic Development Authority, which would take control 
of all the earth's uranium and thorium deposhs, and own and operate all faciUties 
concemed whh the development or use of atomic energy."^  Bernard Bamch was appointed 
to present the plan to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. Oppenheimer did 
not believe Bamch was up to the job, later saying of his appointment: "That was the day I 
gave up hope."^ The Soviet Union rejected what had by this time became known as the 
Bamch Plan, primarily due to concems about veto powers and the inspection system. 
On one occasion, during his work on the intemational control plan, Oppenheimer 
met with President Tmman. During this meeting Oppenheimer suddenly revealed the guilt 
he felt over his role in the A-bomb project, blurting out: "Mr. President, I have blood on my 
hands''^ This greatly offended Tmman. "Don't you bring that fellow around again," 
Tmman later told Acheson, going on to say: "After all, all he did was make the bomb. I'm 
the guy who fired h off"^ In a lecture in 1947 Oppenheimer said: "In some sort of cmde 
sense which no vulgarity, no humor, no over-statement can quite extinguish, the physicists 
have known sin; and this is a knowledge which they cannot lose." After Hiroshima it 
seems that Oppenheimer feh it was his task to help ensure that nuclear technology 
represented a "great hope" rather than a "great peril" ^ The Bamch Plan was part of 
Oppenheimer's effort to do just this. It represented a bold break with tradhional ideas about 
security, and reflected Oppenheimer's idealistic hopes for the post-war world. However, 
Soviet rejection of this plan meant that pre-nuclear political and military tradition survived 
the advent of the nuclear age. Security through the intemational development of atomic 
energy was rejected in favor of the more traditional concept of security through military 
superiority.'° On the day Gromyko rejected the Bamch Plan, Oppenheimer told David 
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Lilienthal: "I am ready to go anywhere and do anything, but I am bankmpt of further 
ideas."" 
Oppenheimer soon had a place to go and things to do. In the autumn of 1946, the 
Atomic Energy Act was passed.'^ This act transferted the nuclear program from military 
hands to the civilian hands of the newly created Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). David 
Lilienthal, former chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority, was appointed chairman of 
the AEC. Oppenheimer was named a member of the nine-person General Advisory 
Committee (GAC), created to advise the new Commission on scientific and technical 
matters. This committee included scientists such as Isidor Rabi, Enrico Fermi, James 
Conant, and Lee Dubridge, men who had played important roles in the nuclear revolution. 
Oppenheimer arrived late to the first meeting of the GAC only to find that his fellow 
1 % 
members had elected him chairman. Since nuclear energy was a new field, Lilienthal and 
the AEC leaned heavily on Oppenheimer and the GAC. This made Oppenheimer the most 
influential scientific advisor at least until 1950, perhaps beyond.^ '* 
In early September 1949, the crew of a special Air Force plane on patrol over the 
Bering Sea picked up traces of radioactive materials in the atmosphere. Oppenheimer, who 
was called in to help analyze the samples, had no doubt that the Soviet Union had tested a 
nuclear weapon and that the American monopoly was now a piece of history. ^ ^ This news 
immediately sparked fierce debate about how the Unhed States should respond. The AEC 
began planning increased efforts in all nuclear weapon projects, from the proposed use of 
small thermonuclear reactions to boost fission weapons, to the improvement of fission 
weapons along more conventional lines. ^ ^ Some believed there was only one suhable 
response to the Soviet A-bomb, and that was the immediate development of a 
thermonuclear weapon. Among those pushing for the H-bomb, were scientists such as 
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Edward Teller, Luis Alvarez and Wendell Latimer; a majority of the Joint Committee on 
Atomic Energy, particularly its chairman Senator Brian McMahon, and his staff chief 
William L. Borden; Lewis Strauss, a member of the AEC; and milhary figures such as 
General Kenneth D. Nichols. These early H-bomb advocates would later play important 
roles in the removal of Oppenheimer's security clearance. 
After a brief period of confusion, the debate following the Soviet test came to 
revolve around one question; Was a high priority program for the development of a 
thermonuclear weapon the appropriate response to a Soviet fission weapon?^^ The AEC 
called a special meeting of the General Advisory Committee to not only address this 
question, but to also discuss and recommend upon any other means of ensuring the defense 
and security of the Unhed States. ^ ^ The GAC's report consisted of three separate sections 
plus two addenda. Part I of the report recommended, among other things, "an 
intensification of efforts to make atomic weapons available for tactical purposes."'^ Some 
have argued that after Hiroshima, Oppenheimer came to oppose all nuclear weapons, but 
this was not the case. In the absence of any international arms-limitation agreements, 
Oppenheimer and the GAC recognized the need for nuclear weapons, and they promoted 
efforts to increase the variety and numbers of such weapons. It is tme that Oppenheimer 
liked to see nuclear weapons only in defensive terms, but he certainly did not categorically 
oppose them. Oppenheimer and the GAC only opposed one kind of nuclear weapon, and 
that was the H-bomb. 
Part ni of the report addressed the most important question, the question of whether 
or not the H-bomb should be developed. The report concluded that "h would be wrong at 
the present moment to commh ourselves to an all-out effort towards its development."^° 
The GAC report also called for enough information on the H-bomb to be declassified so 
that a public statement of policy could be made. Because the destmctive power of a 
thermonuclear weapon is potentially limhless, the majority addendum, signed by 
Oppenheimer, concluded that such a weapon "might become a weapon of genocide," and 
thus represented an intolerable threat to the human race.^' The majority addendum also 
' York. The Advisors, p. 45. 
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stated: "We believe a super bomb should never be produced. Mankind would be better off 
not to have a demonstration of the feasibility of such a weapon until the present climate of 
world opinion changes."^^ Thus the GAC report called for greater openness on the 
govemment's behalf, called for the development of tactical nuclear weapons, and opposed 
the H-bomb. Such issues would be picked up again and again by Oppenheimer in later 
years, and would be important factors leading to his later hearing. 
An A-bomb with a yield of approximately fifteen kilotons had killed almost 
150,000 people at Hiroshima, leaving Oppenheimer whh "blood on his hands" By the time 
of the Soviet test, the Unhed States had developed weapons with yields of over a hundred 
kilotons. The yield of the H-bomb, if h could be built, would be measured in megatons. The 
H-bomb would be far too powerfiil for use against a military target; it would be too big for 
anything but the utter obliteration of urban life. Oppenheimer and the GAC believed such a 
weapon was simply too murderous. It is of great importance that Oppenheimer opposed the 
H-bomb due to moral considerations. Had he opposed h solely due to technical 
considerations, h would have been acceptable for him to revise his opinions in the face of 
later technical advancements. The fact that he opposed the H-bomb for moral reasons not 
only angered H-bomb advocates who did not believe thermonuclear weapons were different 
to fission weapons in terms of morality, but it also permanently established him, in the 
minds of many, as an opponent of a thermonuclear weapon. Even after the decision to go 
ahead whh the H-bomb, and his support of the later H-bomb design, Oppenheimer was 
forever seen as a moral cmsader against the H-bomb. 
Just as Oppenheimer had come to be known as the "father of the A-bomb" for his 
directorship of the Los Alamos laboratory, he, as the chairman of the GAC, also came to 
symbolize opposhion to the H-bomb. By this time Oppenheimer was already well-known 
for his influence, and the advocates of the H-bomb generally believed that the GAC was 
under Oppenheimer's spell. They believed the GAC opposed the H-bomb simply because 
Oppenheimer opposed the H-bomb, and every time a scientist declined to work on the H-
bomb project, had second thoughts, or lost enthusiasm for the project, Oppenheimer's 
influence was believed to be involved. Such concems were openly raised in the Nichols 
letter of charges against Oppenheimer.^^ 
fibid. 
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Oppenheimer's opposhion to the H-bomb not only eamed him powerful enemies 
among Air Force leaders and other H-bomb advocates, but in subsequent years, 
Oppenheimer's poshion was seen in increasingly sinister terms. An article published soon 
after the hearing said: 
The plain fact was that on a question of overriding importance Dr. Oppenheimer 
was wrong, tragically and frightfully wrong. Repeatedly the point was made in Dr. 
Oppenheimer's behalf that it is not criminal to be wrong. That is undebatable. It's 
not criminal to be wrong about the weapons of the atomic age, only fatal. ^ '* 
The article went on to say that if the United States had followed Oppenheimer's advice, and 
not buih the H-bomb, h would have quhe possibly been guihy of "murdering freedom". In 
light of later developments, particularly the Soviet detonation of a thermonuclear device in 
1953, Oppenheimer's opposition to the H-bomb came to be seen as having seriously 
endangered United States security. Events such as the Berlin Blockade, the "loss" of China, 
and the North Korean invasion of South Korea, made the Soviet Union seem increasingly 
malevolent and untmstworthy. Such developments, combined whh Soviet advancements in 
nuclear science, resulted in American officials becoming increasingly concemed with the 
safeguarding of America's nuclear supremacy. In such a frigid Cold War atmosphere, 
Oppenheimer's opposition to the H-bomb appeared to many as both dangerous and foolish. 
Oppenheimer's opposhion to the H-bomb would be part of the alarming "pattem of 
activities" discussed by AEC witnesses such as Wilson and Griggs. This opposition would 
also be used as an example of the poor "judgement" discussed by witnesses such as Teller 
and Alvarez. Thus Oppenheimer's moral opposhion to the H-bomb led to his later removal 
in two general ways. Firstly, because of this opposition, his name became permanently 
associated whh policies that were seen in increasingly unfavorable terms as the Cold War 
set in. Secondly, it eamed him personal enemies among H-bomb advocates. These enemies, 
particularly after the successful development of the H-bomb and its incorporation into 
American defense strategy, held increasingly powerful positions. Strauss eventually came 
to hold Oppenheimer's future in his hands. 
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Shortly after the presidential decision to proceed with the development of the H-
bomb in January 1950, Oppenheimer appeared on a radio program and discussed the 
dangers of secrecy. This was another area of great concem to him. He said: 
The decision to seek or not to seek intemational control of atomic energy, the 
decision to try to make or not to make the hydrogen bomb, these are complex 
technical things, but they touch the very base of our morality. It is a grave danger 
for us that these decisions are taken on the basis of facts held secret. 
Such a statement expresses a recurring theme in Oppenheimer's lectures and writings. 
Oppenheimer grew increasingly concerned about issues of secrecy, continually calling for 
greater opeimess and candor of behalf of the govemment. In scientific circles, where 
Oppenheimer's character was moulded, h was the dissemination and sharing of information 
that was all important. However, in the political climate of the early Cold War, when Soviet 
agents like Klaus Fuchs were being uncovered, such views met with increasing concem and 
suspicion from govemment officials. Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were arrested as Soviet 
spies during the summer of 1950. On 19 June 1953, the Rosenbergs were executed in the 
electric chair at Sing Sing prison. During the sentencing of the Rosenbergs, Judge Irving 
Kaufman said that their crimes had been "worse than murder," for in giving the Soviets the 
secret of the bomb they were largely responsible for the aggression in Korea.^ ^ In such an 
atmosphere, it is difficuh to see how Oppenheimer's calls for greater opermess and candor 
could have met with anything but suspicion and animosity. 
In early 1948 the Navy sought Oppenheimer's views on how the United States 
should prepare for future wars. "Whatever our hopes for the future, we must surely be 
prepared, both in planning and in the development of weapons... for more than one kind of 
conflict," Oppenheimer replied. ^ ^ Oppenheimer found the kind of thinking that would 
eventually lead to the doctrine of "Massive Retaliation" to be both dangerous and morally 
repugnant, and was one of the first to recognize the dangers inherent in a complete reliance 
on weapons of mass destmction. Oppenheimer called for the development of tactical 
nuclear weapons in the 1949 GAC report, and in a 1951 article he raised this issue again, 
while also attacking the entire concept of strategic bombing. Oppenheimer did not condemn 
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strategic bombing himself, but rather quoted Admiral Ofstie, who said that many senior 
officers in the Navy feh that "strategic air warfare, as practiced in the past and proposed for 
the future, is militarily unsound and of limhed effect, and is morally wrong, and is 
decidedly harmful to the stability of a postwar world. "^ ^ 
In this same year, 1951, Oppenheimer fiirther developed his ideas about tactical 
nuclear weapons during his participation in Project Vista. Oppenheimer was widely 
recognized as the author of the controversial fifth chapter of the report, which discussed 
ways in which nuclear weapons could be used in ground operations. The report 
recommended that the stockpile of fissionable material be divided into thirds, with the 
Strategic Air Command (SAC) getting a third, one third being assigned to the tactical 
defense of Europe, and one third going into reserve. ^ ^ However, it was the Report's attitude 
toward the use of the SAC and strategic weapons that most worried Air Force officials. In 
his testimony, Griggs said that the Vista Report recommended, in the event of war, that the 
President should announce that the United States would withhold the SAC from attacking 
chies or urban areas except in response to a similar attack by the Soviets.^" Later evidence 
indicates that the Vista Report never contained such a recommendation, but even ignoring 
this issue, the Vista Report eamed Oppenheimer powerful enemies. 
It is important to note that in this period, the concepts of Giulio Douhet still 
dominated Air Force doctrine.^ ^ According to this doctrine, the secret to military success 
lay in the swift penetration, deep behind enemy lines, of an aerial bombing force, which 
would destroy the enemy's ability, and will, to wage war. Due to a belief in such a doctrine, 
the Air Force gave overwhelming priority to its offensive wing, believing the best defense 
was a strong offense. The end of the Second World War and the onset of the nuclear age 
reinforced the significance of strategic ah- power. Victory in Japan was attributed, 
somewhat misleadingly, almost entirely to the use of nuclear weapons against Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki. Victory in Japan came to symbolize the triumph of strategic air power.^ ^ 
Thus Air Force doctrine gained widespread acceptance; strategic bombing was given pride 
of place in post-war security policy, and the Air Force alone was given the privilege of 
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deploying the few nuclear weapons possessed by the United States at this time. 
Representative Clarence Cannon, chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, 
dismissed the importance of the Army and Navy, and said: "The only way to avoid war is 
to have available at any instant the means of striking swiftly.... And the atomic bomb, 
serviced by land-based bombers, is the only weapon which can ensure that protection." 
Such views gave the SAC a good deal of influence and privilege. 
Oppenheimer's views on tactical weapons, as reflected in lectures and articles, as 
well as in his recommendations in the Vista Report, posed a threat to the Air Force's 
privileged poshion among the military services. Waher G. Whitman said in the course of 
his testimony before the Gray Board: "The Strategic Air Command had thought of the 
atomic weapon as solely restricted to hs own use. I think that there was some definite 
resentment at the implication that this was not just the Strategic Air Command's 
weapon."^ "* There was more than a little "resentment" towards Oppenheimer; some feh that 
he was out to destroy the SAC, and thus American securhy. It seemed, to the authors of The 
Hydrogen Bomb, "as if some US scientists, unable to stop Teller and his hydrogen bomb, 
had seized on the invitations to study the Air Force as an opportunity to make political war 
on the SAC." ^^  Oppenheimer's role in the Vista Project and the later Lincoln Summer 
Study (which argued for a system of continental air defense) was seen as part of a sinister 
"pattem of activhies" designed to curb, if not eliminate ahogether, strategic air power. 
Oppenheimer's "pattem of activities" was one thing when it simply opposed and 
offended the Strategic Air Command, but whh the coming of Eisenhower's "New Look" 
and the adoption of Massive Retaliation, such activhies took on a whole new meaning. As 
General Maxwell Taylor pointed out, "the New Look was little more than the old air power 
dogma set forth in Madison Avenue trappings and now formally buttressed upon Massive 
Retaliation as the central strategic concept." With the adoption of Massive Retaliation, 
Air Force doctrine became the central strategic doctrine of Unhed States defense policy. As 
Thomas Wilson has pointed out, "when contending doctrine becomes accepted dogma, 
dissent is tumed into heresy."^^ 
" Quoted in Walter Millis, Arms and the State: Civil-Military Elements in National Policy (New York: 
Twentieth Century Fund, 1958), p. 240. 
'' Transcript, p. 498. 
" Quoted in Major, The Oppenheimer Hearing, p. 163. 
'^ Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (London: Stevens and Sons, 1960), p. 17. Also quoted in 
Wilson, The Great Weapons Heresy, p. 145. 
^' Wilson, The Great Weapons Heresy, p. 146. 
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In the late afternoon of 17 Febmary 1953, in an off-the-record lecture delivered to a 
weekly meeting of the Council on Foreign Relations, Oppenheimer presented his major 
criticisms of prevailing national security policy.^ ^ Most of what he discussed seems obvious 
today, but at the time h was shocking in hs vision and crhicisms. The off-the-record mle is 
taken quhe seriously by the Council on Foreign Relations, and thus the text of 
Oppenheimer's original speech is not available. However, Foreign Affairs did later publish 
a more circumspect version of this lecture.^ ^ By this time Oppenheimer had become almost 
obsessed with the need for greater candor and openness on behalf of the govemment. 
Because the govemment would not inform the public, Oppenheimer chose to do so himself, 
in a very limited fashion, without violating security. Of the arms race Oppenheimer said: "I 
must tell about it without communicating anything. I must reveal its nature without 
revealing anything; and this I propose to do."'*^ Oppenheimer went on to discuss the 
changing face of nuclear weapons, repeatedly calling for the government to inform the 
public on such issues, saying, "we should all know - not precisely, but quantitatively and, 
above all, authoritatively - where we stand in these matters.""^ ^ Such ideas flew dkectly in 
the face of fiercely held tenets about nuclear secrecy. To add insult to injury, Oppenheimer 
illustrated the dangers of secrecy by quoting a high officer of the Air Defense Conmiand as 
saying: "it was our policy to attempt to protect our striking force, but that it was not really 
our policy to attempt to protect this country, for that is so big a job that it would interfere 
with our retaliatory capabilities."'*^ Such a statement reflected official poUcy views, yet 
Oppenheimer labeled such a view foolish and dismissed it as the product of excessive 
secrecy and a lack of information. 
Oppenheimer went on to discuss the futilhy of the arms race. He said that the Soviet 
Union was approximately four years behind the United States in the field of nuclear 
weapons. This, he pointed out, "sounds comfortably reassuring...as though the job of 
keeping ahead were being satisfactorily accomplished."'*^ However, he went on to say that 
this four-year gap would soon be meaningless. 
" Ibid., p. 153. 
'^ J. Robert Oppenheimer, "Atomic Weapons and American Policy", Foreign Affairs, 31,4 (July 1953), pp. 
525-535. 
"^ Ibid., p. 526. 
'•' Ibid., p. 527. 
''''Ibid., p. 531. 
''Ibid 
56 
The very least we can say is that, looking ten years ahead, h is likely to be small 
comfort that the Soviet Union is four years behind us, and small comfort that they 
are only about half as big. The very least we can conclude is that our twenty-
thousandth bomb, useful as it may be in filling the vast munitions pipelines of a 
great war, will not in any deep strategic sense offset their two-thousandth.'*^ 
Oppenheimer anticipated a time when both superpowers would be able to completely 
destroy the other, but not without risking their own destmction, like "two scorpions in a 
bottle, each capable of killing the other, but only at risk of hs own life."'*^ 
Oppenheimer went on to offer three reforms, which he believed were "so obvious, 
so important, [and] so sure to be salutary."'*^ The first was "candor on the part of the 
officials of the United States Govemment to the officials, the representatives, [and] the 
people of their country."'*^ The second reform concemed the need for candor in American 
deaUngs with its allies, and the third called for increased efforts at continental defense. 
Oppenheimer admitted that such suggestions had been discussed in the past, but pointed out 
that they had yet to be acted upon. The entire tone of the article implied that the time for 
debate was over, and that these suggestions, already largely associated with Oppenheimer 
himself, were essential to ensure the continued security of the United States, if not the 
world. 
Oppenheimer's lecture, and the subsequent Foreign Affairs article, predicted the 
death of a historical doctrine that still taught people that national security lay in the 
attairmient of military superiority over one's enemies. He thus undermined the basis for 
official strategy up to that point, and yet offered no solution. The few suggestions he did 
make were simply the reiteration of ideas that he had been promoting for several years, 
ideas that the govemment found quite objectionable. Oppenheimer did not simply discuss 
the dangers of secrecy, but clearly attacked govemment policies, almost threatening to 
inform the public himself if the govemment would not do so. At this time Massive 
Retaliation was the official strategic doctrine of the Administration, yet Oppenheimer 
labeled such an approach "folly." At a time when the govemment was primarily concemed 
whh its offensive capabilhies and the protection of its nuclear secrets, Oppenheimer was 
''Ibid., p. 52^. 
"Ibid, p. 529. 
'^ Ibid., p. 530. 
"Ibid 
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publicly calling for an increased emphasis on defense and greater candor and openness on 
behalf of the government. After having made powerful enemies in the Air Force and among 
H-bomb proponents, Oppenheimer now alienated even more moderate officials. 
Three months after Oppenheimer's lecture to the Council on Foreign Relations, he 
was under direct public attack on the pages of Fortune magazine, in an unsigned article 
enthled: "The Hidden Stmggle for the H-bomb: The story of Dr. Oppenheimer's persistent 
campaign to reverse U.S. milhary strategy."'** It tumed out that an Air Force reserve officer, 
who had close associations with many other high-ranking officers in the service, had 
written the article.'*^ The article opened by stating that "a Ufe and death stmggle over 
national milhary policy has developed between an influential group of American scientists 
and the military."^" The heroes of this article were Teller, Strauss, and the SAC. The 
detection of the Soviet A-bomb test was attributed to Strauss' "sixth sense," and the 
decision to pursue the H-bomb was laid down to Strauss' urging. The successful test of a 
thermonuclear weapon was attributed solely to Teller's genius, even though more recently 
declassified documentation reveals that Teller was in fact responsible for most of the delays 
in the H-bomb program. ^ ^ 
The villains of the Fortune article were Oppenheimer and his followers, a group 
calling themselves ZORC. Oppenheimer and his "disciples" were portrayed as a group 
persistently trying to undermine the SAC, not only through then- opposhion to the H-bomb, 
but through their participation in projects such as Vista and the Lincoln Summer Study. The 
article stated that "Oppenheimer had transformed Vista into an exercise for rewriting U.S. 
strategy - an exercise introduced by a veiled suggestion that Air Force doctrine was based 
on the slaughter of civilians." The article went on to discuss how there formed around 
Oppenheimer a group called ZORC - Z for Zacharias; O for Oppenheimer; R for Rabi; and 
C for Charles Lauritsen. This group was accused of trying to prove the feasibility of a "jet-
'' Fortune, "The Hidden Struggle for the H-bomb: The story of Dr. Oppenheimer's persistent campaign to 
reverse U.S. military strategy", 47, 5 (May 1953), pp. 109-110; 230. 
"' Larson, Oppenheimer and the Atomic Bomb, p. 146. 
'^ Ibid., p. 109. 
'^ WiUiam J. Broad, "Rewriting the History of the H-bomb", Science, 155 (19 November 1989), pp. 769-772. 
- This article smdies a recently declassified history of the H-bomb written in 1954 by Hans Bethe. This 
history shows that it was technical errors by Teller, rather than political opposition by Oppenheimer, that 
hindered work on the H-bomb. 
" Fortune, "The Hidden Struggle for the H-bomb", p. 110. 
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propelled, electronically hedged Maginot Line", in order to "undercut the 'deterrent-
retaliatory' argument"." 
The Fortune article clearly anticipated the testimony of such anti-Oppenheimer 
whnesses as Mr. Griggs, the former chief scientist to the Department of the Air Force, and 
Greneral Wilson, a Major General in the Strategic Air Command. This article was the first 
known mention of the ZORC group that would feature in Griggs' testimony. Like the 
testimony of Griggs and Wilson, this article clearly shows that the SAC saw Oppenheimer 
as a dangerous threat to Air Force doctrine, and thus to then- privileged poshion among the 
services. The Fortune article, again like later testimony, portrayed Oppenheimer as putting 
the SAC, and thus national security, at risk due to moral concerns. When discussing the 
idea of national defense, the Fortune article said: "the essence of the ZORC idea is that the 
fortress concept offers a more moral solution to the dilemma of cold-war strategy than does 
SAC." '^* The Fortune article concluded by saying that Oppenheimer and ZORC had failed 
to rewrite American strategy, and that the SAC had retained "its mighty mission."^^ 
However, the article also correctly stated that the issues Oppenheimer raised, continued "to 
haunt national milhary policy."^^ Oppenheimer's later security hearing was partly an effort 
by the SAC to exorcise such issues once and for all. 
As Joseph and Stewart Alsop said, "the record of the Gray Board hearings reeks like 
a compost heap with emotions engendered by old policy disputes."^^ Oppenheimer had 
eamed a host of powerful enemies through his heretical views on defense and security 
policy. However, this was not the only way that Oppenheimer's character led to his 
removal. As already discussed, during his Los Alamos days Oppenheimer's arrogance and 
sharp tongue made an enemy out of Kenneth Nichols, who was the General Manager of the 
AEC during Oppenheimer's hearing. Even more hnportant was Oppenheimer's relationship 
with Lewis Strauss, the author of the majority decision of the AEC. It was Strauss who was 
primarily responsible for the conclusion that Oppenheimer's clearance should be removed 
due to "fundamental defects in his 'character.'"^^ Strauss, perhaps more than any other 
"^  Ibid., p. 230. The term "jet-propelled, electronically hedged Maginot Line" simply referred to the system of 
continental air defense proposed by the Lincoln Summer Study. 
''Ibid 
"Ibid 
"Ibid 
''^ Joseph and Stewart Alsop, "We Accuse", Harper's Magazine, 209 (October 1954), p. 37. 
" United States Atomic Energy Commission, In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer: Texts of Principal 
Documents and Letters of Personnel Security Board, General Manager, Commissioners {Waslangion: United 
States Govemment Printing Office, 1954), p. 51. 
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single individual, was responsible for Oppenheimer's removal, and thus warrants special 
attention. 
Strauss was an arrogant self-made millionaire who was never in doubt as to the 
correctness of his views. Though he had only a high school education, he stmggled to 
understand physics and was both proud and anxious of his intellectual abilities.'^ He 
prided himself on being treated as an intellectual equal by physicists. Thus h seems almost 
inevhable that Strauss would have a bad relationship whh Oppenheimer, an intellectual 
snob who had no time for those who pretended to know more than they actually did, and 
who was all too willing to point out the intellectual shortcomings of others. The 
crystallizing incident in the trouble between Oppenheimer and Strauss was a disagreement 
over the export of radioactive isotopes to American allies. In a hearing before the Joint 
Committee on Atomic Energy, Strauss argued against the export of radioactive isotopes on 
the grounds that they could be used to make nuclear weapons. When Oppenheimer took the 
whness chah- to give his opinion, he said: 
No one can force me to say you cannot use these isotopes for atomic energy. You 
can use a shovel for atomic energy. In fact you do. You can use a bottle of beer for 
atomic energy. In fact you do. But to get some perspective, the fact is that during 
the war and after the war these materials have played no significant part and in my 
knowledge no part at all.^ ° 
With the mention of a bottle of beer, a ripple of laughter ran through the hearing room. 
Philip Stem, who was present at the hearing, said that even to the uniformed observer, h 
was clear Oppenheimer was making a fool of someone.^ ^ At this point someone posed the 
question: "Is it tme. Doctor, that the over-all national defense of a country rests on more 
than secret military development alone?" Oppenheimer replied, "Of course it does...My 
own rating of the importance of isotopes in this broad sense is that they are far less 
important than electronic devices, but far more important than, let us say, vitamins."^^ Once 
again, to Strauss' humiliation, laughter filled the room. 
'^ Barton J. Bernstein, "In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer'', Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences, 
12, 1 (1982), p. 205. 
*° Goodchild, J. Robert Oppenheimer: 'Shatterer of Worlds' (London: British Broadcasting Corporation, 
1980), p. 195. 
'^ Stem, The Oppenheimer Case: Security on Trial, p. 129. 
^'Ibid, p. 129-30. 
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After the hearing Oppenheimer asked AEC General Counsel Joseph Volpe, who had 
been seated next to him, how he thought he had done. Volpe, who had seen rage and 
humiliation clearly drawn on Strauss' face, replied, ''Too well, Robert. Much too well." 
Lilienthal later wrote in his journals: 
My heart sank when I heard the offhand way Oppenheimer dismissed Strauss' 
objections - which is what they deserved, as to their lack or merit - but I knew the 
kind of man we were dealing whh... .1 had feared, from that time on, that this would 
be a thing for which Oppenheimer might have to pay in Strauss' enmity. '^* 
Once again, Oppenheimer's arrogance and sharp tongue had earned him a powerful enemy. 
Lilienthal was right to think that Oppenheimer might have to pay for the way he treated 
Strauss, for as soon as Strauss was in a poshion to end Oppenheimer's career as a 
govemment advisor, he moved to do exactly that. 
Strauss became Chairman of the AEC on 3 July 1953, and whhin just four days he 
had ordered the removal of all classified documents in Oppenheimer's possession, in 
preparation for a security review.^^ Strauss promised J. Edgar Hoover, who believed that 
Oppenheimer had "moral and character deficiencies," that he would purge Oppenheimer.^^ 
It seems clear that Strauss was planning to remove Oppenheimer quietly, just as he had 
purged other opponents, but William L. Borden closed such an avenue. Borden, former 
chief of staff of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, had long been suspicious of 
Oppenheimer. He had served in Air Force bomber crews during the war, and had written a 
book extolling strategic bombing. Borden explained in 1954, that his doubts about 
Oppenheimer had grown between 1950 and 1953 as he had watched Oppenheimer take 
policy poshions that seemed anthhetical to America's interests.^^ In Borden's view, 
Oppenheimer fanatically opposed "anything that might give us some good out of the atom," 
most importantly the H-bomb. On Saturday, 7 November 1953, Borden sent a registered 
^'Ibid., p. 130. 
^ David E. Lilienthal, The Journals of David E. Lilienthal, Vol. III.. Venturesome Years. 1950-1955 (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 522. 
^' New York Times, 14 April 1954, p. 18. 
^ Harold P. Green, "The Oppenheimer Case: A Study in the Abuse of Law", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 
33, 7 (September 1977), p. 16. - Green was the man primarily responsible for drafting AEC General 
Manager, K. D. Nichols' letter of charges against Oppenheimer. In February 1954, for reasons of personal 
conscience he asked to be reUeved of any further responsibilities in the case. He was alarmed at Nichols' 
personal enthusiasm for the Oppenheimer case. After reading the Commission's final decision he submitted 
his resignation. 
^^  Bernstein, "In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer", p. 199. 
^ William L. Borden quoted in Bernstein, "In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer", p. 199. 
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letter to J. Edgar Hoover, stating that more probably than not Oppenheimer was an agent of 
the Soviet Union. In this letter Borden drew attention to Oppenheimer's radical background 
and opposhion to the H-bomb. 
Though few took such allegations seriously, this letter proved to be the trigger that 
led directly to Oppenheimer's security hearing. When h became clear that a hearing was 
inevitable, Strauss hired the aggressive Roger Robb to represent the Commission. Robb 
was an attomey with extensive prosecutorial experience, having tried twenty-three murder 
cases, obtaining an unusually high number of convictions.^^ The presence of a prosecutor at 
a security hearings was unheard of, as such hearings were supposed to be inquiries rather 
than trials. Strauss also personally intervened to ensure that Luis Alvarez, an anti-
Oppenheimer witness, would testify. AEC General Manager, K. D. Nichols, another enemy 
of Oppenheimer's, also took a personal interest in Oppenheimer's prosecution. Nichols 
discussed Oppenheimer's bad attitude and arrogance whh Harold Green, the primary author 
of the letter of charges against Oppenheimer, and encouraged him to approach his drafting 
of the charges whh greater enthusiasm. ^ ° The animosity of Nichols and Strauss, combined 
with Borden's resurrection of Oppenheimer's left-wing past, opened the way for 
Oppenheimer's adversaries to effect his complete removal fi^om policy-making ckcles. 
^' Stem. The Oppenheimer Case: Security on Trial, p. 239. 
™ Ibid., p. 226. 
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The Oppenheimer hearing has attracted much scholarly attention. It represented an 
important watershed in American security policy, in the relationship between science and 
govemment, and in the development of American defense strategy. However, the 
Oppenheimer case has also attracted attention for an altogether more human reason. It has 
attracted attention because, as Rachel HoUoway has pointed-out, stories of challenged 
character have always intrigued the American people.^ Whether it was Richard Nixon's 
emotional defense of Checkers and Pat's cloth coat, or Jimmy Swaggert's pleas for 
forgiveness of sin, Americans have been drawn to trials of character. And this is exactly 
what the Oppenheimer hearing was, a trial of character. 
An analysis of the transcript promptly reveals that the Oppenheimer hearing was no 
ordinary security hearing. Though a good deal of the testimony dealt with Oppenheimer's 
former left-wing "associations," the principal witnesses for the prosecution frankly 
admitted that they did not question Oppenheimer's loyalty. Oppenheimer's discretion with 
classified material was also not in question, and thus the issue of "associations" became 
irrelevant. Whom Oppenheimer associated with was unimportant if there was no risk of 
him revealing government secrets to such associates. Yet Oppenheimer was declared a 
"security risk," even though the traditional grounds for such a conclusion were dismissed. 
He was declared a security risk because of, among other things, the quality of his advice, 
his lack of "enthusiasm" for the H-bomb, his arrogance, his great influence, and his poor 
"wisdom and judgement" General Wilson of the Strategic Air Command, went so far as to 
argue that even Oppenheimer's command of the English language represented a threat to 
the national interest.^ When all the issues are taken together h is clear that it was 
Oppenheimer's character that was on trial in early 1954. 
Scholars in an effort to explain the forces behind Oppenheimer's hearing have 
pointed to things such as Oppenheimer's opposhion to the H-bomb, his alienation of the 
Strategic Air Command, and his numerous and powerful enemies. However, such factors, 
when treated separately do not make sense, for they are simply manifestations of a deeper 
cause. To understand why Oppenheimer took the views that he did, and how he alienated 
the SAC and people such as Strauss, one must understand Oppenheimer's unique character. 
' Rachel L. HoUoway, In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer: Politics, Rhetoric, and Self-Defense (London: 
Praeger, 1993), p. 6. 
' Transcript, p. 685. 
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Oppenheimer's character was forged in a world far removed from polhics, and h was his 
character, unsuited to the policy-making environment he entered after the war, which cost 
him his security clearance. 
Oppenheimer's parents were members of the Ethical Culture Society, and 
Oppenheimer attended the Society's school. Thus "moral law" and ethics played a large 
part in Oppenheimer's childhood, and he developed a moralistic outlook. After 
Oppenheimer left school he entered the intemational world of science, where tmth was the 
only goal and rationality the only method. Here h was feh that the responsibility of 
scientific mind was to "challenge and test all doctrine, to expose all views, discuss all 
possibilhies, and reject all errors in the free air of open debate."^ Such values became 
fundamental parts of Oppenheimer's character, and throughout his life his approach to 
problems would reflect these values. Perhaps arising from his brilliance, Oppenheimer also 
developed an abilhy both to charm and persuade, as well as to alienate and offend. To those 
whom Oppenheimer considered his intellectual equal, or even superior, Oppenheimer was a 
remarkably charming individual, who always seemed to know just what to say. To those 
Oppenheimer considered banal or foolish, he was often verbally abusive and ridiculing. 
It was Oppenheimer's strong moral and scientific values that led to his participation 
in the A-bomb project. Oppenheimer believed that the United States was in a desperate race 
with the Nazis to produce a nuclear weapon. The A-bomb also came to be seen as 
something that would end the war quickly and save both American and enemy lives. 
However, by the end of the war, such motivating factors had evaporated. Whh the invasion 
of Germany and the success of the Alsos mission, h became clear that the Germans had not 
been close to producing a weapon. The reports that came in fi^om Hiroshima showed that 
the A-bomb had caused greater death and destmction than the scientists had believed it 
would. In retrospect, Oppenheimer saw himself not as having saved the free world from a 
Nazi bomb, but as having simply added a new and immensely more destmctive weapon to 
the American arsenal. Oppenheimer came to feel that the physicists had committed a 
terrible sin by creating the A-bomb, the power of which was bmtally demonstrated in 
Japan, and felt that as director of Los Alamos he in particular had blood on his hands. 
When Oppenheimer entered post-war policy-making circles he not only brought his 
great knowledge and understanding of nuclear weapons, but he brought his strong moral 
Thomas W. Wilson, The Great Weapons Heresy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1970), p. 3. 
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and scientific values, and his feelings of guilt. Oppenheimer was determined to tum nuclear 
power, the most destmctive force the world had ever seen, into a positive force for peace. 
The Bamch Plan represented Oppenheimer's idealistic hopes for a fiiture where security 
would be based on intemational controls and cooperation. The SAC in particular was 
alarmed by this idea of giving up the American monopoly and "intemationalizing" nuclear 
power. When the Bamch plan was rejected by the Soviets, security through intemational 
cooperation was rejected and the traditional conception of security through military 
superiorly prevailed. In the absence of intemational controls, Oppenheimer recognized the 
need for nuclear weapons, but he called for tactical nuclear weapons that would retum 
warfare to the battlefield, weapons that could be used for something short of total war. He 
saw the development of an even more powerfiil thermonuclear weapon, which was far too 
powerful for use against purely milhary targets, as morally repugnant. 
Combined whh Oppenheimer's moral outlook was his scientific mindset. As already 
mentioned, Oppenheimer believed that h was the scientist's responsibility to challenge and 
test all doctrine, to expose all views, discuss all possibilities, and reject all errors in an 
atmosphere of open debate. Oppenheimer openly criticized and challenged official doctrine, 
and continually called for greater openness and candor from the govemment. He criticized 
the ideas behind the doctrine of Massive Retaliation, holding such ideas up as an example 
of the foolishness that arose out of excessive secrecy. Oppenheimer believed that excessive 
secrecy stifled the democratic process and slowed scientific development. He wanted the 
govemment to release more information to the public so that the people might have a say in 
the issues of the nuclear age. Oppenheimer also caUed for the sharing of nuclear secrets 
with American allies. 
Unfortunately for Oppenheimer, his views and character, suited as they were to the 
world of science, did not suit his new environment. Policy-making circles were dominated 
by views almost completely antithetical to those held by Oppenheimer. Generally speaking, 
individuals in these circles did not like free and open debate, but were primarily concemed 
whh the keeping of secrets. They did not want to share their secrets with allies, but only 
wanted to ensure American nuclear supremacy. Such individuals didn't see criticism as a 
way to spark valuable debate, but rather saw h as a threat to their polhical poshions, and 
thus as something to be silenced. Policy-making circles were also generally made up of 
men who were nationalistic in view. They were primarily concerned whh American lives, 
not the lives of an enemy, and thus saw the use of the A-bomb in Japan, not as a great 
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tragedy, but as a great victory. A majority in policy-making ch-cles came to support the 
development of the H-bomb, believing h was the only way to insure American supremacy. 
The H-bomb was clearly more powerful than the A-bomb, and most policy-makers 
believed there was no difference between the two in terms of morality, and even if there 
was, moral issues were not their primary concern. 
Oppenheimer's unpopular views eamed him powerful enemies, particularly among 
H-bomb advocates and the SAC. It must be remembered that Oppenheimer was the most 
powerful scientific advisor at least until 1950, and his views carried a good deal of 
influence. H-bomb advocates feh that Oppenheimer's opposhion to then- weapon 
significantly slowed its development, and thus endangered American security. These 
feelings would become more acute in light of later Cold War developments and the Soviet 
detonation of a thermonuclear device in 1953. To those scientists responsible for the 
development of the H-bomb, particularly Edward Teller, Oppenheimer's opposition 
threatened to min their careers, and thus represented something very personal. The 
Strategic Air Command was not only offended by Oppenheimer's opposition to the H-
bomb, but felt threatened by his position on other issues as well. Oppenheimer's opposition 
to strategic bombing, his promotion of tactical over strategic nuclear weapons, and his 
suggestion of a three way division of fissionable material, threatened to undermine the 
SAC's privileged position at the center of Unhed States defense strategy. 
H-bomb advocates like Kenneth Nichols and Lewis Strauss played central roles 
both in the initiation of Oppenheimer's security hearing, and in the final decision to 
permanently remove his clearance. Other H-bomb advocates and Air Force officials played 
important roles in the hearing as witnesses for the prosecution, recommending against the 
reinstatement of Oppenheimer's clearance. Most of these people had not only disagreed 
with Oppenheimer over policy issues, but had also been on the receiving end of 
Oppenheimer's acerbic tongue. Nichols had been the butt of strong language from 
Oppenheimer during work at Los Alamos, and Oppenheimer had humiliated Strauss in 
front of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Oppenheimer could afford to be arrogant 
when he was simply a scientist and a teacher, for the enemies he created at that time would 
not come to hold his future in their hands. He could also afford to voice unpopular views, 
challenge prevailing ideas, and call for the open discussion of all issues when he was a 
scientist. Debate and disagreement are essential parts of the process of discovery. However, 
such character traits, when brought into policy-making circles, eventually cost him his 
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career. Oppenheimer's character, well suited to scientific and academic ch-cles, was 
completely unsuited to Cold War polhical or policy-making circles, and h is this simple 
fact that lay behind the Oppenheimer hearing. 
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